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Administrative Collateral Estoppel in
California: A Critical Evaluation
of People v. Sims
by
THOMAS F. CROSBY, JR.*
The cross-use of collateral estoppel in administrative and judicial
proceedings is an often poorly understood subject. Through this device,
a litigant may be able to employ an administrative determination to pre-
clude relitigation of an issue in a subsequent legal action. People v. Sims, I
a six-to-one ruling of the California Supreme Court authored by then
Chief Justice Rose Bird in 1982, considerably extended the possible uses
of administrative preclusion and was arguably one of the most significant
decisions of her tenure.2 Oddly, it has drawn very little scholarly atten-
tion.3 Specifically, Sims holds collateral estoppel may be applied in a
* Associate Justice, Court of Appeal of the State of California; A.B. 1962, Stanford
University; LL.B. 1965, Boalt Hall School of Law, University of California, Berkeley; LL.M.
1988, University of Virginia School of Law.
The author gratefully acknowledges the comments and suggestions of Professor Douglas
Leslie of the University of Virginia School of Law and the inspiration of Professor Daniel
Meador, Director of the Graduate Program for Judges at the same institution, as well as the
helpful criticism of my own staff at the California Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division
Three, particularly Kim Dunning, Esq.
1. 32 Cal. 3d 468, 651 P.2d 321, 186 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1982).
2. It was also arguably one of the least significant. And because, as explained anon, the
holding purports to be very narrow, it may be avoided easily even in its own specific context.
Because of its cloudy procedural posture with respect to the finality of the underlying adminis-
trative decision, the Sims case may not have merited supreme court review at all. Neverthe-
less, Sims overrules precedent that rather severely restricted the application of administrative
preclusion. Empire Star Mines Co. v. Cal. Employment Comm'n, 28 Cal. 2d 33, 48, 168 P.2d
686, 695 (1946), rev'd, 32 Cal. 3d 468, 479-80, 651 P.2d 321, 328, 186 Cal. Rptr. 77, 84 (1982).
For that reason alone it surely will be considered the leading California case on the subject
until it receives judicial or legislative revision.
3. Sims has not gone unnoticed in legal literature entirely, but it has been treated mostly
in a reportorial manner. See, eg., Sherwood, Evaluation of Administrative Collateral Estoppel,
6 CAL. LAW. 33 (June 1986); The California Supreme Court Survey, A Review of Decisions,
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welfare fraud prosecution after a former determination of the same enti-
tlement question in favor of the recipient/defendant in a "fair hearing" at
the Department of Social Services (DSS). 4 The case was a shocker for
criminal practitioners, especially prosecutors, and for welfare administra-
tors and hearing officers as well.
Since its appearance almost six years ago, Sims has received an un-
easy reception in the legislature and the appellate courts of California.
Judges have adopted the Sims rationale in some similar situations but not
in others, and collateral estoppel has been specifically eliminated by the
legislature in at least two instances in response to Sims.5 But Sims itself
has not been overturned.
Sims poses a serious navigational hazard to litigants attempting to
chart a safe course through parallel, or potentially successive, adminis-
trative and judicial proceedings. This Article argues that the case was
decided wrongly for this and a number of other reasons and concludes
Sims' rule should be confined to relatively minor matters when the bene-
fits of administrative preclusion might outweigh its numerous
disadvantages.
In section I, the Article discusses issue preclusion principles in gen-
eral, explaining res judicata, collateral estoppel and the law of the case.
Section II examines People v. Sims and its rationale, exploring its rela-
tionship to previous federal and California cases and the use of adminis-
trative collateral estoppel in criminal cases. Section III describes out the
Sims' test and discusses the difficulties involved with each prong of the
test. Section IV examines the claim of the Sims majority that its rule is
based on sound public policy. This Article suggests that the Sims deci-
sion does not serve public policy because it 1) creates an unforeseeable
bar to potential litigants who are deemed to be in privity with a party in
the first action; and 2) ignores the hardship the decision imposes on agen-
cies that are subjected to intensified litigation of seemingly minor matters
because of the potentially significant effect of agency decisions in other
arenas. Section V discusses the legislative and judicial responses to Sims.
Section VI examines the effect of Sims on administrative procedures, us-
ing the California Department of Vehicles' drunk driver "refusal" hear-
ing as an example. Finally, section VII proposes several ways that the
July 1982-Nov. 1982, 10 PEPPERDINE L. REv. 835, 875 (1983) (authored by John G. Marich,
Michelle L. Morgando and Mark A. Ozzello).
4. Sims, 32 Cal. 3d at 489-90, 651 P.2d at 334-35, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 90.
5. CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 1960 (West Supp. 1988) (originally enacted as A. B. 3950,
Stats. 1986, ch. 283, § 1); CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 1256.7 (West 1986) (originally enacted as
A. B. 3883, Stats. 1984, ch. 1058, § 1).
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effect of the Sims rule might be contained. For example, barring the use
of administrative collateral estoppel in serious criminal cases could lessen
agency litigation. Denying preclusive effect to issues decided by agencies
that do not enjoy constitutionally authorized judicial power-at least in
matters involving substantial rights or damages-would preserve the
right to a jury trial, prevent unfair surprise, and avoid the perpetuation of
unjust results in cases where serious consequences might ensue for the
estopped party
I. Preclusion Principles
Our legal structure contains many overlapping layers of dispute res-
olution systems. State and federal courts as well as various state and
federal agencies may have the jurisdiction to become involved in a
number of controversies arising out of the same factual matrix. Of neces-
sity, the law has developed devices to prevent endless relitigation of
causes and issues in parallel or successive proceedings. Some of them,
such as the doctrine of full faith and credit and the principle that no
accused may be placed twice in jeopardy, 6 are long-standing and consti-
tutionally based.7 Others, such as res judicata and collateral estoppel,
essentially are court-created tools of judicial economy designed to put a
finality to litigation and to avoid inconsistent results.
A final determination of an action on the merits is res judicata (or
merger and bar) and precludes relitigation between the same parties on
that cause of action or any allegation or defense that was or might have
been presented in an earlier suit.8 A first judgment for the defendant
may bar any ensuing effort by the plaintiff to relitigate the same cause of
action. An initial judgment for the plaintiff can merge with a subsequent
claim and prevent its assertion in the later proceeding. 9
If the second suit involves a different cause of action, merger and bar
do not apply. The first judgment, however, may be entitled to limited
recognition under the rubric of collateral estoppel and thus foreclose re-
litigation of any matter previously tried and decided.10 In other words,
6. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1; id amend. V; Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794
(1969).
7. Findings of fact of other states' administrative tribunals must be accorded full faith
and credit. Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261, 284-86 (1980).
8. Clark v. Lesher, 46 Cal. 2d 874, 880-81, 299 P.2d 865, (1969).
9. See Busick v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Bd., 7 Cal. 3d 967, 973, 500 P.2d
1386, 1390, 104 Cal. Rptr. 42, 46 (1972).
10. There is an important distinction between the offensive and defensive use of collateral
estoppel. In contrast to defensive use of the doctrine, offensive preclusion generally is applied
sparingly. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 329-31 (1979). Because Sims is a
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merger and bar preclude subsequent claims; collateral estoppel does the
same with respect to issues already resolved. I"
Both can be applied to administrative adjudications, whether the
second tribunal is another agency or a court. 12 Decades ago Professor
Davis stated:
The key to a sound solution of problems of res judicata in administra-
tive law is recognition that the traditional principle of res judicata as
developed in the judicial system should be fully applicable to some ad-
ministrative action, that the principle should not be at all applicable to
other administrative action, and that much administrative action
should be subject to a qualified or relaxed set of rules. 13
Before Sims California law gave preclusive effect to the administra-
tive determinations of agencies exercising constitutionally authorized ju-
dicial power. 14 But even in that context, the state supreme court had not
employed the rule previously in a criminal case. t5
defensive preclusion case, the differences in treatment are not particularly pertinent to the
present discussion; but Sims has been applied offensively against a real estate salesperson in a
civil action following a licensing proceeding. Imen v. Glassford, 201 Cal. App. 3d 898, 906-07,
247 Cal. Rptr. 514, 518 (1988). See generally Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. Univ. of
Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 334 (1971) (discussing estoppel pleas); Currie, Civil Procedure: The
Tempest Brews, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 25, 27-35 (1965) (discussing the mutuality rule of J. Tray-
nor); Note, The Impacts of Defensive and Offensive Assertion of Collateral Estoppel by a Non-
party, 35 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1010, 1024-1036 (1967) (authored by Michael Kimmel)
(discussing strategic aspects of collateral estoppel).
11. "Claim preclusion" and "issue preclusion," respectively, are more modem labels for
these doctrines. They are interchangeable with the older terms. Shell, Res Judicata and Col-
lateral Estoppel Effects of Commercial Arbitration, 35 UCLA L. REV. 623, 625 nn.9-10 (1988).
Nevertheless, the Sims opinion employs the traditional terminology as does this Article.
Sims is technically an issue preclusion case; but the issue precluded, whether the defend-
ant cohabited while receiving welfare payments, was essential to prove a concurrent welfare
fraud charge and effectively barred the prosecution. Possibly for this reason, the court makes
no particular effort to differentiate between res judicata and collateral estoppel. See Kelley,
Developments in Water and Environmental Law, 18 U.C. DAVIS. L. REV. 97, 139 n.201 (1984).
12. Univ. of Tenn. v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 797-98 (1986) (unreviewed determination of
state administrative law judge); Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470
U.S. 373, 380-81 (1985) (judicially reviewed agency decision); Sims, 32 Cal. 3d at 479, 651
P.2d at 327, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 83 (unreviewed determination of state agency); 4 K. C. DAVIS,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 21:9 (2d ed. 1983); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDG-
MENTS § 83 (1982).
13. 2 K. C. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 18.03, at 568 (1958), quoted in
Sims, 32 Cal. 3d at 478, 651 P.2d at 327, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 82. Sims' citation to this passage is
somewhat ironic. Sims was probably a case where, in Professor Davis' words, "the principle
should not [have been] applicable .... " Id.
14. Empire Star Mines Co. v. Cal. Employment Comm'n, 28 Cal. 2d 33, 48, 168 P.2d
686, 695 (1946), rev'd, People v. Sims, 32 Cal. 3d 468, 479-80 n.8, 651 P.2d 321, 328 n.8, 186
Cal. Rptr. 77, 84 n.8 (1982).
15. Sims, 32 Cal. 3d at 483, 651 P.2d at 330, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 87.
(Vol. 40
ADMINISTRATIVE COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL
Related to res judicata and collateral estoppel is the "law of the
case" rule.16 It is also a doctrine of longstanding and continues to be
applied today.17 Using the appropriate preclusion label, res judicata ver-
sus law of the case, is not simply a matter of form over substance. Unjust
results usually do not affect the decision to apply collateral estoppel or
res judicata under California law.18 Unjust results do merit considera-
tion, however, when law of the case is at issue:
[T]he doctrine of law of the case which has been recognized as being
harsh is merely a rule of procedure and does not go to the power of the
court. It will not be adhered to where its application will result in an
unjust decision. The principal ground for making an exception to the
doctrine of law of the case is an intervening or contemporaneous
change in the law. 19
16. The closeness of the two preclusive devices can be illustrated by the facts of City and
County of San Francisco v. United Ass'n of Journeymen, 42 Cal. 3d 810, 812, 726 P.2d 538,
539, 230 Cal. Rptr. 856, 857 (1986). There the superior court issued a preliminary injunction
to enjoin a public employees' strike, an appealable order, and the court of appeal affirmed in a
published opinion. City and County of San Francisco v. Evankovich, 69 Cal. App. 3d 41, 56,
137 Cal. Rptr. 883, 893 (1977). The city then filed a second action against the union to recover
its damages; and, based on Evankovich, the trial court directed the verdict on liability. The
city recovered $4,080,000.
The damage award was appealed. While the appeal was pending, the supreme court un-
dercut the Evankovich decision and upheld the right of most public employees to strike.
County Sanitation Dist. No. 2 v. Los Angeles County Employee's Ass'n. 38 Cal. 3d 564, 587,
699 P.2d 835, 849, 214 Cal. Rptr. 424, 438, cert. denied, 474 U.S. 995 (1985).
The court of appeal affirmed the award of damages in the second suit based on collateral
estoppel, notwithstanding the erroneous decision in the first appeal. Compare Hollywood Cir-
cle Inc. v Dep't of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 55 Cal. 2d 728, 733, 361 P.2d 712, 715, 13 Cal.
Rptr. 104, 107 (1979) (a final judgment is res judicata even though contrary to statute where
the court has jurisdiction) with Slater v. Blackwood, 15 Cal. 3d 791, 796-97, 543 P.2d 593, 596,
126 Cal. Rptr. 225, 227-28 (1975) (resjudicata is not proper where the earlier decision is based
on law later overturned). If the damage award had been obtained on the original complaint,
however, the law of the case doctrine, not collateral estoppel, would have been at issue. (The
supreme court ultimately reversed on an unrelated point. United Ass'n of Journeymen, 42 Cal.
3d at 813, 726 P.2d at 540, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 858.)
17. Once an appellate court has relied on a particular rule of law to decide a matter, that
principle becomes the "law of the case." With several qualifications, it applies in all subse-
quent proceedings in the cause, even if a court later determines that the rule is wrong. The
qualifications are "that the point of law involved must have been necessary to the prior deci-
sion, that the matter must have been actually presented and determined by the court, and that
application of the doctrine will not result in an unjust decision." Pigeon Point Ranch, Inc. v.
Perot, 69 Cal. 2d 227, 231, 379 P.2d 321, 322, 28 Cal. Rptr. 865, 866 (1963).
18. Slater v. Blackwood, 15 Cal. 3d 791, 796-97, 543 P.2d 593, 595-96, 126 Cal. Rptr.
225, 227-28 (1975).
19. Clemente v. State, 40 Cal. 3d 202, 212, 707 P.2d 818, 823, 219 Cal. Rptr. 445, 450
(1985) (citations omitted). A more liberal treatment of law of the case problems is somewhat
defensible. It might be highly impractical to allow every concluded proceeding to begin anew
after a change in the law, but the burden would be far less in a relatively few pending cases.
Even the legislature on rare occasions extends an opportunity to relitigate matters long
since final. See CAL. CIv. CODE § 5124 (West Supp. 1985) (repealed 1983) (authorizing re-
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II. People v. Sims
People v. Sims and the decisions it discusses provide an excellent
vehicle for an examination of the various preclusion doctrines. As will
appear, courts have considerable difficulty in applying them and, oddly,
often greater trouble in simply identifying the preclusion device appro-
priate to the case at hand. It is first necessary, however, to examine the
legal odyssey of a mother on public assistance from an informal fair hear-
ing in a local welfare office to the Supreme Court of California. The
unlikely outcome of that pilgrimage may affect many litigants in the fu-
ture in a virtually endless variety of contexts. That it has not done so
already, if indeed that is the case, may be more attributable to the Cali-
fornia Bar's failure to appreciate Sims' potential applications than any
other explanation.
A. The Facts of Sims
In April of 1978, the Social Services Department of Sonoma County
(SSDSC) 20 notified June Leora Lopes Sims that it intended to reduce her
future grants in order to recoup alleged overpayments. The SSDSC
claimed Sims had failed to disclose that her children's stepfather, Charles
Sims, was both employed and living with her from December 1976 to
April 1978. As a result, the SSDSC charged she received excess benefits
of $5,395 in Aid to Families With Dependent Children and $1,144 in
food stamps. In August 1978 she requested a fair hearing to challenge
the decision pursuant to California Welfare and Institutions Code section
10950.21 Meanwhile, Sims was charged with felony welfare fraud under
opening of final judgment of dissolution to allow recapture of military pension benefits,
notwithstanding res judicata or rules relating to finality of judgments); see also In re Marriage
of Barnes, 43 Cal. 3d 1371, 1377, 743 P.2d 915, 918, 240 Cal. Rptr. 855, 858, (1987) (holding
California law of finality of judgments does not preclude retroactive effect of legislative
changes to California community property law); In re Marriage of Doud, 181 Cal. App. 3d
510, 518, 521-22, 226 Cal. Rptr. 423, 425, 427-28 (1986) (holding California legislature may
modify the division of military benefits upon dissolution of marriage in a manner consistent
with federal law).
20. Sims uses a more convenient abbreviation for the local welfare agency, "County."
But one of the key questions before the court was whether the county district attorney was in
privity with that agency. The nomenclature selected in Sims suggests the answer, although
both are ultimately found to be representatives of the state, not the county. Since the decision
is highly vulnerable to criticism on this point, a neutral, though less stylistic, rubric is em-
ployed here.
21. The section's numbers are initially transposed to "19050" in the Sims opinion. 32
Cal. 3d at 473, 651 P.2d at 324, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 80. They are given correctly later. Id. at
479, 651 P.2d at 328, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 84. In 1978 § 10950 provided in part that "any appli-
cant for or recipient of public social services . . . dissatisfied with any action of the county
department relating to his application for or receipt of public social services ... shall, in person
[Vol. 40
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section 11483 of the California Welfare and Institutions Code and a mis-
demeanor, fraudulently obtaining food stamps in violation of former
Welfare and Institutions Code section 18910.22 Sims was held to answer
after a preliminary hearing on the complaint, and the district attorney
filed an information alleging the same offenses on September 25, 1978, in
superior court. Sims was arraigned on October 12.23
When her fair hearing to challenge the SSDSC decision took place
on November 29, 1978, the criminal matter still was unresolved. 24 A
DSS hearing officer presided at the fair hearing. As will appear, the fair
hearing process is designed to be relaxed and informal, with few proce-
dural rules. The SSDSC, claiming the pending criminal charges divested
DSS of jurisdiction, refused to participate. After Sims presented a copy
of the investigative report prepared by the SSDSC and the testimony of
or through an authorized representative,. . . be accorded an opportunity for a fair hearing."
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 10950 (West 1980) (amended by Stats. 1981 ch. 1, § 1, eff. Dec.
4, 1980; Stats. 1985 ch. 1274, § 13, eff. Sept. 30, 1985; Stats. 1986 ch. 415, § 2, eff. July 17,
1986).
22. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 18910 (West 1980) (repealed by Stats. 1979, ch. 1170,
§ 15); See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 10980 (West Supp. 1988).
23. Sims, 32 Cal. 3d. at 473, 657 P.2d. at 324, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
24. Because the prosecution proceeded by complaint and information, Sims had a prelim-
inary hearing, or the opportunity to have one, before the fair hearing occurred. CAL. PENAL
CODE § 859b (West 1980 & Supp. 1988). Apparently it was not argued that the decision to
bind her over to superior court might have collaterally estopped her at the fair hearing despite
the lesser burden of proof at a probable cause hearing. With respect to the limited issue
preclusive effect of the rulings at preliminary hearings on subsequent criminal proceedings, see
People v. Uhlemann, 9 Cal. 3d 662, 667-68, 511 P.2d 609, 612, 108 Cal. Rptr. 657, 660 (1973);
People v. Prewitt, 52 Cal. 2d 330, 339-40, 341 P.2d 1, 6 (1959); People v. Ortiviz, 74 Cal. App.
3d 537, 540-42, 141 Cal. Rptr. 483, 484-85 (1977).
In successive administrative proceedings, the California Supreme Court has approved
claim preclusion even when the standard of proof at the subsequent hearing is greater: "We
are of the opinion... that the difference in burden of proof does not justify any exception to
the general rule of res judicata." French v. Rishell, 40 Cal. 2d 477, 481, 254 P.2d 26, 28
(1953). French is cited with approval in Sims on a related point, 32 Cal. 3d at 481, 651 P.2d at
329, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 84, but it has not often been followed on the lesser burden of proof
statement. See Carlson v. Wald, 151 Cal. App. 3d 598, 600-01, 199 Cal. Rptr. 10, 11-12 (1984)
(citing and following French, although the issue is not specifically discussed); Greatorex v.
Board of Admin., 91 Cal. App. 3d 54, 58, 154 Cal. Rptr. 37, 38 (1979). The opposite position
appears to have attracted far more adherents. In re Coughlin, 16 Cal. 3d 52, 58, 545 P.2d 249,
253, 127 Cal. Rptr. 337, 341 (1976); Teitelbaum Furs, Inc. v. Dominion Ins. Co., 58 Cal. 2d
601, 604-05, 375 P.2d 439, 440, 25 Cal. Rptr. 559, 560 (1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 966
(1963); Rutherford v. State, 188 Cal. App. 3d 1267, 1282, 233 Cal. Rptr. 781, 788-89 (1987);
Holt v. Department of Food & Agric., 171 Cal. App. 3d 427, 433, 218 Cal. Rptr. 1, 4-5 (1985);
In re Anderson, 107 Cal. App. 2d 670, 671-72, 237 P.2d 720, 721 (1951). Federal law is also
contrary to French. One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232, 233-35
(1972) (the United States Supreme Court held that because of varying standards of proof, an
acquittal of a criminal charge does not amount to an adjudication of the issue in a subsequent
civil suit).
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Charles Sims denying cohabitation during the period alleged, the hearing
officer determined a silent SSDSC had not met its burden of proof and
overruled the proposed grant reduction. 25 This finding was adopted by
the Director of the DSS on February 7, 1979; the SSDSC did not seek a
rehearing or judicial review. 26
Sims then brought a common-law motion to dismiss the informa-
tion, in part contending that the decision at the fair hearing collaterally
estopped the criminal prosecution. The motion was granted, and the dis-
trict attorney appealed.2 7 The cause ultimately was decided by the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court in 1982.
B. The Rationale of Sims
Initially, three issues faced the Sims court: 1) whether agency deci-
sions ever could be given preclusive effect in a court of law; 2) what types
of agencies could render decisions with preclusive effect; and 3) whether
an agency determination could collaterally estop a criminal prosecution.
25. Sims, 32 Cal. 3d at 474, 651 P.2d at 324, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
26. Id. DSS fair hearing procedures are outlined in the California Welfare and Institu-
tions Code. At the time of Sims' hearing, they provided the following: A request for hearing
was to be filed within one year. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 10951 (West 1980). The hearing
was then required to commence within 45 days on at least 10 days notice. Id. § 10952 (West
1980) (amended 1982). Hearing officers could be referees employed by the DSS;, the director,
personally, or a designated assistant; or administrative law judges. Id. § 10953 (West 1980)
(amended 1986). The hearing was to be informal, encouraging free and open discussion un-
constrained by rules of procedure or evidence applicable in a trial. Id. § 10955 (West 1980).
Referees were to prepare a proposed decision to be approved by the chief referee of the
DSS and filed with the director within 75 days. Id. § 10958 (West 1980) (amended 1981).
Within 30 days of receipt of the proposed decision the director could adopt it, decide the
matter himself with or without new evidence, or order a rehearing. Failure to act was deemed
an acceptance of the proposed decision. Id. § 10959 (West 1980) (amended 1986). The appli-
cant or recipient could request a rehearing within 30 days of the finality of the decision, and
the director had to act on the request no earlier than five and no later than 15 days after. If the
director did not do so, the rehearing was automatically denied. Id. at § 10960 (West 1980)
(amended 1986).
If the determination was in favor of the applicant or recipient, payment of arrearages was
required regardless of present need. Id. at § 10961 (West 1980) (amended 1986). The parties
could seek judicial review of questions of law in the matter by a petition for writ of mandate
filed within one year after receiving notice of the director's action. No filing fee was required,
and a prevailing applicant or recipient could obtain attorney's fees and costs. Id. at § 10962
(West 1980).
Essentially the same rules apply today, although the recipient must now petition within 90
days for a fair hearing, Id. at § 10951 (West 1980) (amended 1979), and hearing officers must
be attorneys, unless the director-who need not be an attorney-elects to conduct the hearing
personally. Id. at §§ 10953, 10953.5 (West Supp. 1988).
27. Sims, 32 Cal. 3d at 474, 325 P.2d at 325, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
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(1) Sims' Support for Administrative Collateral Estoppel
In her majority opinion, Chief Justice Bird first considers whether
an administrative decision may ever collaterally estop a party in the
courthouse. In dealing with this issue, the Sims majority discusses only
two cases: Hollywood Circle, Inc. v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage
Control28 and City & County of San Francisco v. Leung Fai Wah Ang.29
Hollywood Circle was a curious choice for several reasons. Hollywood
Circle did not deal with collateral estoppel, although the chief justice
asserts "Hollywood Circle involved the application of res judicata princi-
ples in the context of successive proceedings before the same administra-
tive agency .... -30 Moreover, the estopping decision in Hollywood
Circle was not an administrative determination but a subsequently disap-
proved opinion of the court of appeal affirming a superior court judgment
upholding an agency's action.31
There are two other interrelated difficulties with the court's reliance
on Hollywood Circle. First, Hollywood Circle is an example of the unjust
perpetuation of a legal error; a case many would argue was decided
wrongly.32 Second, the Hollywood Circle analysis should have turned on
the "law of the case" doctrine,33 not res judicata, administrative or other-
wise. And if it had, the outcome might have been different.
The facts of Hollywood Circle were as follows: Plaintiff was denied
the right to appeal the loss of his on-sale liquor license to the Alcoholic
Beverage Control Appeals Board because his mailed notice of appeal was
held to be untimely. He filed a petition in mandate to require the Board
to consider his appeal, relying on a section of the California Code of Civil
Procedure that allowed additional time for mailed service. Both the trial
court and the court of appeal found the statute inapplicable. 34
A year later the supreme court expressly disapproved the court of
appeal's opinion in an unrelated case.35 The Hollywood Circle plaintiff
28. 55 Cal. 2d 728, 361 P.2d 712, 13 Cal. Rptr. 104 (1961).
29. 97 Cal. App. 3d 673, 159 Cal. Rptr. 56 (1979).
30. Sims, 32 Cal. 3d at 478, 651 P.2d at 327, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 83.
31. Hollywood Circle, 55 Cal. 2d 733, 361 P.2d 715, 13 Cal. Rptr. 107.
32. The point is discussed further below. See infra notes 169-86 and accompanying text.
But see, e-g., Spilker v. Hankin, 188 F.2d 35 (D.C. Cir. 1951) (res judicata should not be used
when the policy behind it would not be served); Adams v. Pearson, 411 111. 431, 443, 104
N.E.2d 267, 273 (1952) (refusing to apply res judicata when the result would be inequitable
and underlying policies to protect a defendant from harassment and the public from multiple
litigation are not fostered).
33. See supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text.
34. Hollywood Circle, 55 Cal. 2d at 729-30, 361 P.2d at 713-14, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 105-06.
35. Pesce v. Dep't of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 51 Cal. 2d 310, 313, 333 P.2d 15, 17
(1958).
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then filed an "Application for Relief from Erroneous Dismissal of Ap-
peal."' 36 Presumably this application was filed in the original cause and
under the same case number. When relief was denied, he brought a new
petition in mandate; and the supreme court, over the vigorous dissent of
two justices, reversed the court of appeal's unanimous refusal to apply
res judicata based on its previous decision. 37
The court of appeal was correct in rejecting the application of res
judicata, but it could have applied law of the case. Although the plaintiff
made two separate trips through the appellate courts in Hollywood Cir-
cle, the attempt to perfect the administrative appeal was essentially one
continuous cause with an identical objective in the same underlying case.
As the Hollywood Circle dissent argued, the appeal could have been
treated as still pending since it had been erroneously rejected at the out-
set.38 Despite its res judicata discussion, Hollywood Circle is a legitimate
relative only of law of the case decisions. Its place in Sims' family tree is
less deserved.
Following its discussion of Hollywood Circle, the Sims majority cites
City & County of San Francisco v. Leung Fai Wah Ang 39 in support of its
conclusion that agency decisions may be used for collateral estoppel pur-
poses at the courthouse.4° The court is on somewhat firmer ground here.
In Leung Fai Wah Ang the court of appeal did hold a decision by a city
board of permit appeals collaterally estopped the city in a subsequent
nuisance action to abate an activity previously approved by the board
under the city's zoning laws. 4 1 While the result in Leung Fai Wah Ang
was unassailable, the court of appeal's use of res judicata was probably
unnecessary. Leung Fai Wah Ang should have prevailed easily on an
ordinary equitable estoppel defense. 42 Equitable estoppel may preclude a
36. Hollywood Circle, 55 Cal. 2d at 730, 361 P.2d at 713, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 105.
37. Id. at 736, 361 P.2d at 717, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 109.
38. Id. at 733-36, 361 P.2d at 715-17, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 107-09 (Schauer, J., dissenting).
39. 97 Cal. App. 3d 673, 679, 159 Cal. Rptr. 56, 59 (1979).
40. Sims, 32 Cal. 3d at 478, 651 P.2d at 327, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 83.
41. 97 Cal. App. 3d at 680, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 60. Leung Fai Wah Ang is itself a curious
opinion in at least one respect: it cites Hollywood Circle for the proposition that even acts "in
excess of jurisdiction" can be subject to res judicata. Id. at 678, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 58. But then
it purports to distinguish its own decision in City and County of San Francisco v. Padilla, 23
Cal. App. 3d 388, 100 Cal. Rptr. 223 (1972), on the basis that in the first proceeding Padilla
was granted a variance "expressly forbidden by law." Leung Fai Wah Ang, 97 Cal. App. 3d at
681, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 60 (emphasis in original). It seems an act "in excess of jurisdiction"
would always be void, but an act "expressly forbidden by law" might not be if it was merely a
decisional error. See Freedom Newspapers, Inc. v. Superior Court, 186 Cal. App. 3d 1102,
1107-08, 231 Cal. Rptr. 189, 191-92 (1986).
42. When a government entity by words or conduct has induced a citizen to believe a
particular thing to be true and to act upon that belief, it will not be permitted to contradict the
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government agency from changing its position once a citizen has relied
detrimentally on an earlier determination.
After this brief discussion of California law on the preliminary issue
of administrative collateral estoppel, Sims turns for "appropriate gui-
dance" to the United States Supreme Court to determine whether the
trial court was correct in using collateral estoppel in the case at hand.43
In United States v. Utah Construction & Mining Co.,44 the Court stated in
dictum, "Occasionally courts have used language to the effect that res
judicata principles do not apply to administrative proceedings, but such
language is certainly too broad."'45 The Court went on to say that collat-
eral estoppel may be applied to administrative decisions "[w]hen an ad-
ministrative agency is acting in a judicial capacity and resolves [the same]
disputed issues of fact properly before it which the parties have had an
adequate opportunity to litigate .... -46 As will appear, although this
test is similar to that previously used in California, it is not identical.
Sims' discussion, however, implies the federal standard has been adopted
in California.47
Chief Justice Bird considers each of the Utah Construction standards
and finds them all satisfied. The first requirement-that the agency act
in a judicial capacity-is examined in the following section. The second
and third requirements, whether disputed issues are identical and oppor-
tunity to litigate, are akin to elements of the California rule and are re-
viewed in section III as part of the analysis of Sims' application of the
California requirements. 48
(2) The Judicial Capacity of an Agency
The federal requirement that the agency must act in a judicial ca-
pacity historically has been a California requirement as well.49 The for-
earlier assertion at a later time. City of Long Beach v. Mansell, 3 Cal. 3d 462, 488-90, 476
P.2d 423, 441-43, 91 Cal. Rptr. 23, 41-43 (1970).
43. Sims, 32 Cal. 3d at 479, 651 P.2d at 327, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 83.
44. 384 U.S. 394 (1966).
45. Id. at 421-22 (footnotes omitted).
46. Id. at 422. Sims' questionable analysis of Hollywood Circle as a case involving succes-
sive agency adjudications suggests that legal, as well as factual, determinations of agency tribu-
nals will be accorded preclusive effect. 32 Cal. 3d at 478, 651 P.2d at 327, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 83.
The United States Supreme Court has also so held. Tait v. Western Md. Ry. Co., 289 U.S.
620, 626-27 (1933). Currently the general rule appears to be that administrative collateral
estoppel applies to issues of fact, law, or mixed questions of fact and law. See e.g., IB J.
MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 0.441[2], at 730 (2d ed. updated 1988).
47. The Ninth Circuit has interpreted Sims in that manner. Eilrich v. Remas, 839 F.2d
630, 632-33 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S.Ct. 60 (1988).
48. See infra notes 109-35 and accompanying text.
49. Sims, 32 Cal. 3d at 479-81 n.8, 651 P.2d at 328 n.8, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 84 n.8; Empire
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mulation of the state rule Sims uses, however, is not drawn from
administrative preclusion cases and, as a consequence, does not specifi-
cally include this element. Nonetheless, the literal language of the Cali-
fornia Constitution and a previous decision of the court, Empire Star
Mines Co. v. California Employment Commissions,50 posed a formidable
barrier to the use of collateral estoppel in Sims on this point.
Article III, section 3 of the California Constitution declares, "The
powers of state government are legislative, executive, and judicial. Per-
sons charged with the exercise of one power may not exercise either of
the others except as permitted by this Constitution." 5' Article VI, sec-
tion 1 provides, "The judicial power of this State is vested in the Supreme
Court, courts of appeal, superior courts, municipal courts, and justice
courts." 52 Since administrative agencies are part of the executive branch,
only those of constitutional origin with a grant of limited judicial powers,
such as the Public Utilities Commission, 53 or those created with judicial
powers by the legislature pursuant to a specific constitutional authoriza-
tion, such as the Agricultural Labor Relations Board, 54 may act in a judi-
cial capacity. The DSS is not one of these exceptional agencies.
The court brushes aside this constitutional argument in a footnote,
however, observing "that the fact that statewide and local administrative
agencies are prohibited from exercising 'judicial power' by the California
Constitution does not mean that agency proceedings and determinations
may never be judicial in nature." 55 This unexplained and exceedingly
opaque "distinction," says the court, "was not recognized by Empire Star
Mines .... upon which the People rely for the proposition that collateral
Star Mines Co. v. Cal. Employment Comm'n, 28 Cal. 2d 33, 48, 168 P.2d 686, 695 (1946). It
is doubtful, however, that the federal and state definitions of "judicial capacity" before Sims
would have coincided. As Sims implies, the Empire Star Mines formulation was formal and
certain: "For the defense of res judicata to operate as an estoppel there must be a judgment
rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction." Empire Star Mines, 28 Cal. 2d at 48, 168 P.2d
at 695 (emphasis added). The federal rule, however, was functional and subject to case-by-case
scrutiny:
[L]anguage to the effect that res judicata principles do not apply to administrative
proceedings ... is certainly too broad. When an administrative agency is acting in a
judicial capacity and resolves disputed issues of fact properly before it which the
parties have had an adequate opportunity to litigate .... res judicata [applies].
Utah Construction, 384 U.S. at 421-22.
50. 28 Cal. 2d 33, 168 P.2d 686 (1946), rev'd, 32 Cal. 3d 468, 479-80 n.8, 651 P.2d 321,
328 n.8, 186 Cal. Rptr. 77, 84 n.8 (1982).
51. CAL. CONST. art. III, § 3.
52. Id. art. IV, § 1.
53. Id. art. XII, § 6.
54. Id. art. XIV, § 1.
55. Sims, 32 Cal. 3d at 479-80 n.8, 651 P.2d at 328 n.8, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 84 n.8.
[Vol. 40THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
ADMINISTRATIVE COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL
estoppel is not applicable to administrative agency decisions."'56 The
Sims opinion correctly explains that "Empire Star Mines . . found a
decision of the California Employment Commission not to be binding in
a subsequent court proceeding because the commission did not exercise
'judicial power' under the Constitution. '57 Nonetheless, the court effort-
lessly sweeps that holding aside: "The analysis of Empire Star Mines is
inconsistent with that conducted in Hollywood Circle, Utah Construction,
and the instant case. So that the law is free from ambiguity in this area
Empire Star Mines is overruled to the extent that it conflicts with this
opinion." 58
In claiming the support of Hollywood Circle and Utah Construction
to reject Empire Star Mines, Sims reaches considerably, particularly with
respect to Hollywood Circle. That case should have turned on judicial,
and not administrative, preclusion.5 9 Moreover, the underlying adminis-
trative proceeding in Hollywood Circle was itself adjudicatory in nature.
Like the Public Utilities Commission and the Workers' Compensation
Appeals Board, the Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Board (the ad-
ministrative agency involved in Hollywood Circle) exercises judicial
power under a specific constitutional grant, 60 and a different type of pre-
clusion at that: law of the case.
In Utah Construction, the United States Supreme Court merely sug-
gested that the Court of Claims was bound by the factual determinations
of the Board of Contract Appeals.61 The Board was empowered to make
those final determinations both by contract and statute.62 The DSS and
Sims, however, had no agreement that the fair hearing result would be
binding in any subsequent proceeding, much less a felony prosecution;
and no statute would have permitted the SSDSC to make such an agree-
ment in any event. Additionally, the DSS factual findings are specifically
not conclusive upon judicial review of an agency determination. The




59. See supra text accompanying note 3 1.
.60. CAL. CONST. art. XX, § 22; Louis Stores, Inc. v. Dep't of Alcoholic Beverage Con-
trol, 57 Cal. 2d 749, 756-57, 371 P.2d 758, 761, 22 Cal. Rptr. 14, 17 (1962).
61. United States v. Utah Construction & Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394, 399 (1960).
62. The Court explained, "Should the contractor be dissatisfied with the administrative
decision and bring... suit .... the finality accorded administrative fact finding by the disputes
clause is limited by the provisions of the Wunderlich Act of 1954 which directs that such a
decision 'shall be final and conclusive . . .' [with certain narrow exceptions]." Id.
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tlements are subject to the exercise of independent judgment by the supe-
rior court.63
Although the collateral estoppel discussion in Utah Construction
was dictum, 64 the United States Supreme Court generally has adhered to
the tests stated there and has recognized their application to administra-
tive determinations that are functionally adjudicative. 65 The Court's ap-
parent preference for substance over form, however, has not been entirely
consistent. One of the cases Utah Construction cited with approval is
Goldstein v. Doft, 66 in which collateral estoppel effect was given to the
decision of an arbitrator. 67 Yet the Court unanimously rejected a similar
notion later in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.68 There, the question
was whether an arbitrator's decision under a collective bargaining agree-
ment could collaterally estop a federal civil rights action. Holding it
could not, the Court explained that arbitration, at least of the type under
review, was not the equivalent of a judicial proceeding for purposes of
collateral estoppel.69 The Alexander Court noted that labor arbitrators
might be unfamiliar with civil rights law; arbitration records are less
complete; the usual rules of evidence are inapplicable; "discovery, com-
pulsory process, cross-examination, and testimony under oath, are often
severely limited or unavailable;" and the judiciary is primarily responsi-
ble for resolution of statutory and constitutional issues. 70 Alexander may
be sui generis, however, because of the strong federal interest in civil
63. Frink v. Prod, 31 Cal. 3d 166, 174-78, 643 P.2d 476, 480-81, 181 Cal. Rptr. 893, 897-
98 (1982); Harlow v. Carleson, 16 Cal. 3d 731, 735-37, 548 P.2d 698, 701-02, 129 Cal. Rptr.
298, 301-02 (1976); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 10962 (West 1980); CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE
§ 1094.5 (West 1980 & Supp. 1989); see Note, De Novo Judicial Review of Administrative
Agency Factual Determinations Implicating Constitutional Rights, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1483,
1485 (1988) (authored by Judah A. Shechter).
64. Borough of Lansdale v. Federal Power Comm'n, 494 F.2d 1104, 1114-15 n.45 (D.C.
Cir. 1974); Nigosian v. Weiss, 343 F. Supp. 757, 758 (E.D. Mich. 1971); Sims, 32 Cal. 3d at
479 n.7, 651 P.2d at 328, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 83.
65. See, e.g., Univ. of Tenn. v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 797-98 (1986); Marrese v. American
Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 382-83 (1985).
66. 236 F. Supp. 730 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), aff'd, 353 F.2d 484 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied,
383 U.S. 960 (1966).
67. 236 F. Supp. at 734. Issue and claim preclusion both have been accorded to state
court judgments by the Supreme Court. Migra v. Warren City School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465
U.S. 75, 85-87 (1984) (claim preclusion); Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 99-101 (1980) (issue
preclusion).
68. 415 U.S. 36, 47 (1974).
69. Id. at 52-54.
70. Id. at 57-58. In closing, the Court did approve the use of the arbitral decision in
evidence, to be "accorded such weight as the court deems appropriate." Id. at 60. No prece-
dent is cited for this "mini-use" of the result of the first proceeding, but the idea seems fair
enough. The Sims court does not consider this far less drastic alternative.
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rights enforcement. 71 As the Court stated, "Arbitral procedures, while
well suited to the resolution of contractual disputes, make arbitration a
comparatively inappropriate forum for the final resolution of rights cre-
ated by Title VII."'72
Much of the Alexander Court's analysis seems applicable to the sit-
uation in Sims. The protection of individual and public rights is at the
heart of the criminal law. The state's interest in enforcing its criminal
law is surely on a plane with its interest in upholding the civil rights of its
citizens. To allow the finding of a single hearing officer-after an abbre-
viated, uncontested hearing-to estop the traditional prerogatives of the
district attorney and the criminal justice system seems unsound for the
reasons expressed in Alexander. It is difficult to defend preclusion of a
public prosecution by means of a decision obtained in an informal,
closed-door proceeding handled by a different agency with different goals
and priorities.
(3) Preclusion in Criminal Cases
The Sims majority laconically announces that previous supreme
court decisions pose no "absolute bar" to the application of collateral
estoppel in a criminal prosecution.73 Literally, that is true because stare
decisis never presents an "absolute bar" to a state supreme court in
resolving a pure question of state law. Nevertheless, the court had to
overrule more than Empire Star Mines to reach its conclusion. The court
of appeal rejected similar arguments only two years earlier in People v.
Demery,74 which involved an appeal from a criminal conviction inconsis-
tent with a previous agency determination in the defendant's favor. Ad-
ditionally, equivalent arguments were rejected only a year before that in
People v. LaMotte,75 in the specific context of a welfare fraud
prosecution.
In Demery, physician Leroy William Demery had been convicted of
illegally prescribing controlled substances in violation of the California
Health and Safety Code. On appeal he claimed he was deprived of the
effective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to argue that his
previous exoneration on the same allegations by the State Board of Medi-
cal Quality Assurance collaterally estopped the criminal proceeding from
71. Arbitration preclusion appears to be quite vigorous in other types of disputes. Shell,
supra note 11, at 673.
72. Alexander, 415 U.S. at 56.
73. Sims, 32 Cal. 3d at 477, 651 P.2d at 327, 186 Cal. Rptr at 82.
74. 104 Cal. App. 3d 548, 560-61, 163 Cal. Rptr. 814, 821 (1980).
75. 92 Cal. App. 3d 604, 608-09, 155 Cal. Rptr. 5, 8-9 (1979).
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relitigating those charges. 76 Demery urged that result was required by
the supreme court's decision in People v. Taylol. 77 which held a criminal
prosecution predicated on vicarious liability could be collaterally es-
topped by the acquittal of the principal actor. That case provided:
(1) the issue necessarily decided at the previous trial is identical to the
one ... sought to be relitigated; ... (2) the previous trial resulted in a
final judgment on the merits; and ... (3) the party against whom col-
lateral estoppel is assessed was a party or in privity with a party at the
prior trial.7
8
The court of appeal did not suggest several of the most obvious re-
sponses to Demery's attack on his counsel's failure to conjure this then
novel defense. First, Empire Star Mines should have barred the use of
collateral estoppel because the Board of Medical Quality Assurance does
not exercise judicial powers under the California Constitution.7 9 Addi-
tionally, no California authority supported the notion that a criminal
prosecution could be collaterally estopped by a former action in the civil
or administrative arena.8 0 Moreover, the court of appeal recently had
rejected the assertion of collateral estoppel in a similar case because the
district attorney is not in privity with state administrative agencies.,g
Instead, after noting Taylor carefully emphasized the "limited na-
ture of its ruling," the Demery court rebuffed Demery's argument on the
76. Demery, 104 Cal. App. 3d at 560-61, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 821. See People v. Pope, 23
Cal. 3d 412, 424, 590 P.2d 859, 865, 152 Cal. Rptr. 732, 738 (1979); People v. Spring, 153 Cal.
App. 3d 1199, 1208 n.5, 200 Cal. Rptr. 849, 855 n.5 (1984); People v. Eckstrom, 43 Cal. App.
3d 996, 1005-06, 118 Cal. Rptr. 391, 397 (1974).
77. 12 Cal. 3d 686, 117 Cal. Rptr. 70, 527 P.2d 622 (1974); see also People v. Superior
Court (Jackson) 44 Cal. App. 3d 494, 500-01, 118 Cal. Rptr. 702, 705-06 (1975) (collateral
estoppel is to be applied to bar litigation of an issue in a criminal matter only if the require-
ments historically associated with the civil doctrine of collateral estoppel are met).
78. Taylor, 12 Cal. 3d at 691, 527 P.2d at 625, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 73 (citing Teitelbaum
Furs, Inc. v. Dominion Ins. Co., 58 Cal. 2d 601, 604, 375 P.2d 439, 440, 25 Cal. Rptr. 559, 560
(1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 966 (1963)) (plaintiff corporation whose principal owner was
convicted of arson was collaterally estopped from pursuing fire insurance company in a civil
action); Bernhard v. Bank of Am., 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942) (dispensing with "mu-
tuality of estoppel," the so-called privity requirement for party asserting collateral estoppel
previously held necessary).
79. Empire Star Mine Co. v. Cal. Employment Comm'n, 28 Cal. 2d 33, 48, 168 P.2d 686,
695 (1946).
80. Sims, 32 Cal. 3d at 483, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 86, 651 P.2d at 330. Had he done so,
Demery's attorney would not have been the first to make the argument. The contention had
been raised earlier in People v. LaMotte, 92 Cal. App. 3d 604, 608, 155 Cal. Rptr. 5, 8 (1979),
but Demery's lawyer most certainly was unaware of that case. It is reasonably clear the La-
Motte decision had not appeared before the commencement of Dr. Demery's trial, although it
was published a year before the court of appeal decided Demery. Curiously, the Demery opin-
ion does not refer to LaMotte in disposing of the ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
81. LaMotte, 92 Cal. App. 3d at 608, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 8.
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merits.8 2 First, the court reasoned that the administrative hearing was
not a "trial"8 3 of the type contemplated in Taylor because its purpose was
"policing licensing requirements rather than making a determination of
criminal guilt or innocence."'84 The court also observed "the standards
of admissibility of evidence differ and the objectives sought are not identi-
cal."'8 5 In addition, the court emphasized that article I, section 16 of the
California Constitution confers a right to a jury trial on the prosecution,
as well as on the defendant and that the application of collateral estoppel
would frustrate this right.86
a. The Differing Objectives of Parallel Proceedings
The differing objectives of two parallel or successive proceedings
have not been considered of particular importance in much of the issue
preclusion lore, and neither the Taylor nor the Utah Construction
formula includes that factor.87 But rather than disapprove Demery on
the point, Sims seemingly accepts the court of appeal's licensing versus
guilt-or-innocence rationale. The Sims court simply finds the facts in
Demery distinguishable: "Here... the function of the DSS fair hearing
was virtually identical to that of the criminal trial."'8 8 Both courts' con-
clusions are debatable.
The purpose behind the Sims welfare fraud prosecution was, pre-
sumably, to punish her and deter others.8 9 If a prison sentence was not
to be imposed, restitution as a condition of probation undoubtedly would
82. Demery, 104 Cal. App. 3d at 561, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 821. It is interesting, if only
coincidental perhaps, that Sims follows the same cautious path.
83. Id. This determination could be viewed as a rejection of the "acting in a judicial
capacity" element under the Utah Construction standard. The court failed to note however
that its conclusion was then compelled by the formal judicial capacity formulation of Empire
Star Mines.
84. Id.
85. Id. Although Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974), employed very
similar reasoning, Demery did not cite it for the point.
86. Demery, 104 Cal. App. 3d at 561, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 821.
87. Nonetheless, such a comparison does make sense. Lack of incentive to litigate in the
first proceeding is an important consideration in the initial policy determination as to whether
preclusion should be applied in a particular situation. See, e.g., In re Dennis B., 18 Cal. 3d
687, 694-95, 557 P.2d 514, 519-20, 135 Cal. Rptr. 82, 87-88 (1976); Teitelbaum Furs, Inc. v.
Dominion Ins. Co., 58 Cal. 2d 601, 604-06, 375 P.2d 439, 440-41, 25 Cal. Rptr. 559, 560-61
(1962); Leader v. State, 182 Cal. App. 3d 1079, 1087, 226 Cal. Rptr. 207, 212 (1986); Mueller
v. J.C. Penney Co., 173 Cal. App. 3d 713, 720-21, 219 Cal. Rptr. 272, 278-79 (1985); People v.
Camp, 10 Cal. App. 3d 651, 653, 89 Cal. Rptr. 242, 243 (1970). Sims' election to discuss the
purposes of the parallel proceedings and its odd resolution of that question opens a fertile field
for further litigation.
88. Sims, 32 Cal. 3d at 483 n.13, 651 P.2d at 330 n.13, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 86 n.13.
89. Sims, 32 Cal. 3d at 488, 651 P.2d at 333, 186 Cal Rptr. at 89.
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have been included in any judgment against her; but recovery of public
funds was not likely to have figured prominently in the district attorney's
charging decision. The cost of the prosecution of welfare fraud in gen-
eral may well exceed the total amount of restitution collected from con-
victed recipients. The more serious offenders usually will go to prison
and pay nothing; and less serious offenders by definition yield little.
Fair hearings, on the other hand, are designed to be informal, inex-
pensive, and speedy means of resolving entitlement disputes and recoup-
ing public funds.90 In Sims' case the hearing dealt solely with whether
she should be required to make restitution by means of a set-off against
her continuing grant. Although that might have involved an indirect
"punishment," the hearing officer had no ability to imprison, fine, or stig-
matize her. And if a determination against her had become known
widely, no deterrent effect on welfare recipients as a group reasonably
could have been anticipated. Restitution is not strong medicine against
thievery.
In Demery the purpose of the prosecution may have been punish-
ment and deterrence. But a criminal conviction can trigger a license rev-
ocation by the Board of Medical Quality Assurance as well. The loss of a
medical license would be a severe sanction to any physician, regardless of
the forum making the original determination of culpability. And,
whether couched in terms of discipline or punishment, the ultimate goal
of both proceedings against Dr. Demery was to stop him from illegally
dispensing drugs and to protect the public.
One of the mysteries of the Sims opinion is the court's election not
to disapprove the Demery decision's conclusion that a marked difference
in purpose attended the two proceedings against the physician-or to at
least dismiss the conclusion as irrelevant. If difference in purpose, which
is not officially part of either the federal or state test, is important, there
is no principled rationale to explain why Sims was entitled to the cloak of
collateral estoppel and Demery was not.
Justice Kaus' dissent in Sims notes that "there are many administra-
tive bodies which in the course of their ordinary duties frequently pass on
factual disputes concerning conduct that may also be the subject of a
criminal prosecution." 9 1 He strongly attacks the majority's attempt to
distinguish Demery with respect to the objectives of these parallel
proceedings:
Professional licensing boards, prison disciplinary panels, local school
boards the State Personnel Board, labor relations boards and the like
90. Id. at 495, 651 P.2d at 338, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 93 (Kaus, J., dissenting).
91. Id. at 493, 651 P.2d at 336, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 92, (Kaus, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 40THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
ADMINISTRATIVE COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL
may all have occasion to determine... whether or not an individual
committed alleged misconduct .... [T]he Legislature surely did not
contemplate that the administrative decision would be routinely con-
clusive on the ultimate issue of an individual's guilt or innocence of
criminal charges relating to the same factual incident.... [A]s Dem-
ery recognizes, the significant differences in both the jurisdiction and
the purposes of the administrative and criminal proceedings compel
the conclusion that the administrative decision is not binding in a sub-
sequent criminal prosecution. 92
By merely distinguishing Demery, the Sims majority could be under-
stood to append "similarity of purpose" to the California test. It there-
fore sets two lines of authority in motion with a murky point of
demarcation between them. Trial judges in future cases may have to
evaluate the respective goals of overlapping administrative and judicial
proceedings. The task will require comparing the case at hand to the
virtually identical scenarios of Sims and Demery, an exercise unlikely to
lead to consistent or predictable results. Additionally, judges will not be
able to rely on the second and third explanations given by the Demery
court for refusing to apply collateral estoppel, differing evidentiary proce-
dures and the right to a jury trial: they are not viable after Sims, if in-
deed they ever were.
b. The Differing Evidentiary Procedures of Agencies and Courts
The Sims opinion specifically fails to address the Demery court's
concern with the significant disparity between the rules of evidence em-
ployed in an administrative forum and those used in the superior court.
To the extent that procedural niceties weigh in the comparison, however,
(and admittedly they usually do not count for much in preclusion lore)
Demery had a better argument than did Sims for the application of ad-
ministrative collateral estoppel. A medical disciplinary proceeding is a
far more formal and deliberate affair than a welfare fair hearing. The
former is controlled by the California Government Code, which sets out
a highly structured procedure, including, for example, the provision of an
administrative law judge who must be an attorney admitted to practice
for at least five years; the requirement of a verified statement of the accu-
sation with factual specificity; the right to demur or object to the accusa-
tion as indefinite or uncertain; and a structured system of discovery.93
92. Id. 651 P.2d at 336-37, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 92 (Kaus, J., dissenting) (emphasis in
original).
93. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 2360, 2364 (West 1985); CAL Gov'T CODE §§ 11500,
11521 (West 1980). Unlike the formal procedure applicable in a felony trial, at the DSS a
radically different format pertains: "The hearing shall be ... impartial and informal ... in
order to encourage free and open discussion by participants. All testimony shall be submitted
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Welfare fair hearings are exempt from the scheme of the California Gov-
ernment Code. 94 The Attorney General represents the Board of Medical
Quality Assurance in medical disciplinary proceedings; but in fair hear-
ings, at least prior to Sims, the SSDSC generally was not represented by
a lawyer, much less a prosecutor who might take care to protect the
state's position in a potential or companion criminal matter.
95
The Sims majority, however, clearly is not impressed with this par-
ticular difficulty. The court concedes the informal nature of the welfare
hearing but states, "this difference does not preclude a finding that the
DSS was acting in a 'judicial capacity.' "96 The court supports its con-
clusion by an imperfect analogy to those agencies which exercise judicial
power under specific constitutional grants. Those decisions presumably
would be entitled to preclusive effect for that reason alone: "Collateral
estoppel effect is given to final decisions of constitutional agencies such as
the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board ... and the Public Utilities
Commission even though [their] proceedings ... are not conducted ac-
cording to judicial rules of evidence."'97 According to the court, the cor-
rect test is "whether the different standard for admitting evidence at the
fair hearing deprived the parties of a fair adversary proceeding in which
they could fully litigate the issue of respondent's fraud."' 98 This implies
that if the administrative decision was achieved via a process that can
inspire some confidence in the result, it should be respected in a subse-
quent judicial proceeding. The court, however, seems to have forgotten
that the SSDSC chose not to participate in the hearing at all. For that
reason, the outcome may have been entirely suspect.
In the cases arising from agencies exercising judicial powers, the
1953 case of French v. Rishel199 provides precedent to support the Sims
majority's lack of interest in procedural niceties: " '[I]t is obviously not
necessary that the same rules of law, practice or evidence should prevail
in both tribunals. The attempt to impose any such limitation would de-
feat the whole purpose of [res judicata] . . . .' " But Sims' considera-
under oath [but] the person conducting the hearing shall not be bound by rules of procedure or
evidence applicable in judicial proceedings .... [T]he applicant or recipient may appear...
[with or without] . . .counsel." CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 10955 (West 1980).
94. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 10953 (West 1980).
95. Only a "representative" of the SSDSC was required to be present, not an attorney
necessarily. Sims, 32 Cal. 3d at 481 n. 11, 651 P.2d at 329 n. 11, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 85 n. 11.
96. Id. at 480, 651 P.2d at 329, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 84.
97. Id. at 480-81, 651 P.2d at 329, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 84.
98. Id. at 481, 651 P.2d at 329, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 85.
99. 40 Cal. 2d 477, 254 P.2d 26 (1953).
100. Id. at 481, 254 P.2d at 28 (quoting 2 A. C. FREEMAN, LAW OF JUDGMENTS § 641, at
1349-50 (5th ed. 1925)); see Sims, 32 Cal. 3d at 480-81, 651 P.2d at 329, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 84.
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tion of evidentiary procedures seems beside the point in light of the
preclusion standards it adopts from Taylor and Utah Construction. Dem-
ery must be considered entirely spurious authority on that question.
c. Prosecution's Right to a Jury Trial
The Demery court's conclusion that application of collateral estop-
pel would unconstitutionally deprive the prosecution of the right to a
jury trial is also extremely suspect.101 If the court were correct on that
ground, administrative collateral estoppel would be possible only when
no right to a jury exists in a subsequent court proceeding. 10 2 Sims rejects
this holding out of hand, but its reasoning is dubious.
Because California Penal Code section 1118.1 allows the trial judge
to order a binding acquittal before submission of a cause to a jury, the
court surmises the prosecution's right to a jury determination is not abso-
lute and concludes that "any right to a jury trial possessed by the state is
only a right to submit to a jury issues of fact which are triable."10 3 Even
before Sims, collateral estoppel was applied without regard to jury trial
The original administrative determination in French was made by the Industrial Accident
Commission (the predecessor of the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board), an agency with
constitutionally based judicial powers. CAL. CONST. art. XX, § 21. Sims also relies on People
v. Western Air Lines, Inc., 42 Cal. 2d 621, 630, 268 P.2d 723, 728 (1954), for the same point.
Sims, 32 Cal. 3d at 481, 651 P.2d at 329, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 84. But Western Air Lines dealt
with a proceeding before the Public Utilities Commission. And there the supreme court specif-
ically noted, "That [the Public Utilities Commission] also possesses judicial powers may not be
questioned." 42 Cal. 2d at 630, 268 P.2d at 728.
101. People v. Demery, 104 Cal. App. 3d 548, 561, 163 Cal. Rptr. 814, 821 (1979). See
U.S. CONST. amend 7 ("In suits at common law... the right of trial by jury shall be preserved,
and no fact tried by a jury shall otherwise be re-examined in any Court of the United States,
than according to the rules of the common law.").
102. The seventh amendment to the Constitution provides a right to a jury trial in actions
at law in existence at the time of its adoption. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 193 (1974).
When a jury trial is of right in the second action but not in the first, collateral estoppel is
nonetheless available in the federal courts. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 333-
37 (1979); Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 338-39 (1966).
Before Katchen and Parklane, which are not cited in Sims, federal cases had not achieved
a consistent approach with respect to administrative preclusion when the right to a jury trial
would be sacrificed by its application. Some held, as Demery suggested, that preclusion may
not be applied at all. E.g., Rachal v. Hill, 435 F.2d 59, 63-64 (5th Cir. 1970). It is doubtful,
however, that Rachal ever represented the majority view. See, e.g., Crane Co. v. American
Standard, Inc., 490 F.2d 332, 343 (2d Cir. 1973); Whitman Elec., Inc. v. Local 363, IBEW,
398 F. Supp. 1218, 1223-24 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (loss of opportunity for a jury trial is a factor to
be considered); Shapiro & Coquillette, The Fetish'of Jury Trial in Civil Cases: A Comment on
Rachal v. Hill, 85 HARV. L. REV. 442, 455-58 (1971); Note, Civil Procedure-Collateral Estop-
pel: The Fourth Circuit Squeezes an Oversized Judgment Through a Narrow Issue, 55 N.C.L.
REv. 219, 226-27 (1977) (authored by Frank L. Williamson).
103. Sims, 32 Cal. 3d at 484 n.13, 651 P.2d at 331 n.13, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 86 n.13.
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rights. 10 4 Because summary judgment procedures long have been held
constitutional in California, 0 5 the supreme court's rationale seems intui-
tively correct in this instance. Still, there is a troublesome aspect to the
court's logic. If California Penal Code section 1118.1 is an exception to
the prosecutor's constitutional right to a jury trial, ' 0 6 how could the leg-
islature amend the state Constitution by mere passage of a statute?
The court's analogy is also dubious on the merits. A superior court
judge's finding in a criminal jury trial is not comparable to a ruling by the
Director of DSS. At the time of the Sims decision, neither the Director
nor the referee was required to be an attorney; the hearings were, and
still are, informal with virtually no rules of evidence; and the Director
may, but is not required to, follow the referee's recommendation.10 7
Moreover, unlike a court-ordered acquittal for lack of sufficient evidence,
the fair hearing decision in Sims' favor was probably based, in whole or
in part, on the failure of the SSDSC to participate at all. Finally, a con-
stitutional right to a jury trial should not be cast aside so lightly. If the
burden of proof at fair hearings was changed to proof beyond a reason-
able doubt, could defendants be denied a jury trial in a criminal prosecu-
tion by use of the same logic? The answer certainly must be negative.
But the reason is not apparent in light of Sims' treatment of the jury trial
issue, and Justice Kaus implies the majority's opinion leads in that
direction. '0 8
104. See, e.g., People v. Reeves, 250 Cal. App. 2d 490, 493-94, 58 Cal. Rptr. 517, 519-20
(1967). In People v. James, 189 Cal. App. 2d 14, 15-16, 10 Cal. Rptr. 809, 810 (1961), two
defendants accused of conspiring to commit forgery were convicted by a jury. The trial court
granted one defendant's motion for new trial and denied the second defendant's motion. The
court of appeal held it was error to deny the second defendant's motion because it is not
possible to conspire alone. The decision is questionable; the granting of a new trial motion is
not the equivalent of an acquittal, and there is no requirement that alleged co-conspirators be
tried together. See People v. Howard, 44 Cal. 3d 375, 412, 749 P.2d 279, 300, 243 Cal. Rptr.
842, 863 (1988).
105. Bank of Am. v. Oil Well Supply Co., 12 Cal. App. 2d 265, 270, 55 P.2d 885, 888
(1936); Cowan Oil & Ref. Co. v. Miley Petroleum Corp., 112 Cal. App. 773, 295 P. 504 (1931).
The same is true in the federal courts. See Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 388-93
(1943) (directed verdict); Gasoline Prod. Co. v. Champlin Ref. Co., 283 U.S. 494, 497-99
(1931) (retrial limited to question of damages); Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. United States, 187
U.S. 315, 319-21 (1902) (summary judgment).
106. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 16; see People v. Washington, 71 Cal. 2d 1061, 1086-87, 458
P.2d 479, 493-94, 80 Cal. Rptr. 567, 581-82 (1969).
107. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
108. "[T]he Legislature surely did not contemplate that the administrative decision would
be routinely conclusive on the ultimate issue of an individual's guilt or innocence of criminal
charges relating to the same factual incident." Sims, 32 Cal. 3d at 493, 651 P.2d at 337, 186
Cal. Rptr. at 92 (Kaus, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). Justice Kaus also notes the
majority's holding means a fair hearing is now "in effect . . .the first stage of the criminal
prosecution ...." Id. at 494, 651 P.2d at 337, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 93 (Kaus, J., dissenting). If
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III. The Sims Test
After bypassing Demery and acknowledging that "this court has not
before given an administrative agency's determination binding effect on a
subsequent criminal proceeding,"10 9 Sims goes on to do just that. After
broadly determining that an administrative agency's finding could be
given collateral estoppel effect in a criminal case, it adopts the tripartite
test set out in Taylor to determine the specific cases when collateral es-
toppel may be applied: identicalness of issues actually litigated; final
judgment on the merits; and identicalness of, or privity with, the party to
be estopped.110 Sims is not clear whether this is the entire test, but it is
certainly part of it. This is the heart of the Sims decision and the portion
that probably most distressed prosecutors, for the court's conclusion on
each of these requirements is suspect.
A. Issues "Actually Litigated"
The Sims majority begins its "actually litigated" discussion by stat-
ing, "[ilt is implicit in . . .[Taylor's] three-prong test that only issues
actually litigated in the initial action may be precluded from the second
proceeding under the collateral estoppel doctrine." '111 Because the
SSDSC refused to participate, it is a difficult question whether Sims' fair
hearing actually was litigated. Referring to the Restatement (Second) of
Judgments, however, the court swiftly disposes of the matter:112 "An
issue is actually litigated '[w]hen [it] is properly raised, by the pleadings
or otherwise, and is submitted for determination, and is determined....
that is the law, should the recipient/defendant be entitled to appointed counsel at the fair
hearing? Under the statutory fair hearing scheme, attorneys fees may be awarded only in the
judicial review proceeding and only to a prevailing recipient. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE
§ 10962 (West 1980). Nonetheless, if the district attorney is encouraged by Sims to intervene
in some manner at the fair hearing stage, can the public defender be far behind? 32 Cal. 3d at
483, 651 P.2d at 330, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 86.
109. Sims, 32 Cal. 3d at 483, 651 P.2d at 330, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 86.
110. Id. at 484-88, 651 P.2d at 331-33, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 87-89 (citing People v. Taylor, 12
Cal. 3d 686, 691, 527 P.2d 622, 625, 117 Cal. Rptr. 70, 73 (1974)). See supra text accompany-
ing notes 77-78.
111. Sims, 32 Cal. 3d at 484, 651 P.2d at 331, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 87, (citing Clark v. Lesher,
46 Cal. 2d 874, 880, 299 P.2d 865, 868 (1956)); see Kelley, supra note 11, at 140 n.206. ("Of
course, collateral estoppel (issue preclusion) raises the question 'was the issue actually liti-
gated,' not merely 'was there an opportunity to litigate' ").
112. Professor Hazard's introduction to the Restatement notes, "[T]his Restatement does
not deal with res judicata in criminal proceedings .... That complex subject... is worthy of
separate exposition. Nevertheless, the analysis of vari6us problems considered herein may
have application to cognate problems arising in criminal litigation." RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF JUDGMENTS 2 (1982).
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A determination may be based on a failure of... proof .... ' ' 113 The
court finds the cohabitation issue was raised by the request for the fair
hearing and the matter was submitted and determined on the merits by
the DSS.
The court's analysis, however, is too facile. The balance of the Re-
statement paragraph the majority cites suggests another possible inter-
pretation of the "actually litigated" requirement: issues can be
"determined on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, . . . judg-
ment on the pleadings,... summary judgment .... directed verdict....
as well as . . .judgment entered on a verdict. A determination may be
based on a failure of pleading or ... proof [or] .. .on the sustaining of
the burden of proof.""14 From this, it would appear the Restatement is
describing dispositions of contested proceedings on the merits of an over-
whelming case, not defaults of the sort that arguably occurred in Sims.
Moreover, beneath the caption "issues not actually litigated," the Re-
statement notes, "A judgment is not conclusive in a subsequent action as
to issues which might have been but were not litigated and determined in
the prior action."" 15 The reason is the stakes may not be worth the effort
or the expense to litigate, or the forum may be inconvenient. 1 6
With the possible exception of Sims, the law of California is gener-
ally in accord with the Restatement. For example, in one of the leading
cases on the subject, the supreme court stated, "A plea of guilty is admis-
sible in a subsequent civil action on the independent ground that it is an
admission. It would not serve the policy underlying collateral estoppel,
however, to make such a plea conclusive."'  7 In at least one instance, the
"not actually litigated" rule was applied in the case of a misdemeanor
conviction based on a contested adjudication because the desire for expe-
diency in the proceeding may have diminished the reliability of the
outcome. "18
Later decisions, however, have permitted the use of collateral estop-
pel when the misdemeanor criminal trial was defended vigorously before
113. Sims, 32 Cal. 3d at 484, 651 P.2d at 331, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 87 (emphasis supplied by
the court) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 comment d (1982)).
114. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 comment d (1982).
115. Id. comment e.
116. Id.
117. Teitelbaum Furs, Inc. v. Dominion Ins. Co., 58 Cal. 2d 601, 605, 375 P.2d 439, 441,
25 Cal. Rptr. 559, 561 (1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 966 (1963); see also Miller v. Superior
Court, 168 Cal. App. 3d 376, 382, 214 Cal. Rptr. 125, 128 (1985); People ex reL State v.
Drinkhouse, 4 Cal. App. 3d 931, 936, 84 Cal. Rptr. 773, 776 (1970); Newman v. Larsen, 225
Cal. App. 2d 22, 23-24, 36 Cal. Rptr. 883, 885-86 (1964).
118. Manes v. Wiggins, 247 Cal. App. 2d 756, 758, 56 Cal. Rptr. 120, 121 (1967).
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a jury with the defendant's (or a privy's) full participation.' 19 The expla-
nation given in Mueller v. J. C. Penney Co. 120 makes perfect sense; but its
holding appears contrary to Sims' "opportunity" to litigate rationale:
"The party sought to be estopped must have had a fair opportunity to
pursue his or her claim the first time. This includes a consideration of
the incentive to litigate in the first action."' 12 I The defect in Sims' treat-
ment of the "actually litigated" problem appears to be that it substitutes
an opportunity for the actuality. That reading of Sims, assuming it is
correct, represents a considerable extension of the reach of the collateral
estoppel net. The SSDSC did not litigate at all, of course; and as the
Mueller court concludes, " 't]he analysis should be made on a case-by-
case basis with the court looking at the actions taken to defend the case
and not at the potential penalties.' "122
The Restatement warns, "In the case of a judgment entered by con-
fession, consent, or default, none of the issues is actually litigated. There-
fore, the rule of this Section does not apply with respect to any issue in a
subsequent action."' 123 The rationale for the rule, as given by the Re-
statement, was seemingly applicable in Sims:
The interests of conserving judicial resources, of maintaining consis-
tency, and of avoiding oppression or harassment of the adverse party
are less compelling when the issue on which preclusion is sought has
not actually been litigated before. And if preclusive effect were given
to issues not litigated, the result might serve to discourage compro-
mise, to decrease the likelihood that the issues in an action would be
narrowed by stipulation, and thus to intensify litigation. 124
119. Leader v. State, 182 Cal. App. 3d 1079, 1087-89, 226 Cal. Rptr. 207, 210-14 (1986);
Mueller v. J.C. Penney Co., 173 Cal. App. 3d 713, 719-21, 219 Cal. Rptr. 272, 277-78 (1985).
Other states have reached similar conclusions, more realistically basing the determination on
the seriousness of the charge rather than the distinction between misdemeanors and felonies.
Crowall v. Heritage Mut. Ins. Co., 118 Wis. 2d 120, 127-28, 346 N.W.2d 327, 332 (1984);
Scott v. Robertson, 583 P.2d 188, 192 (Alaska 1978); but see 4 B. E. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA
PROCEDURE JUDGMENTS § 185, at 3327 (2d ed. 1971) ("The rule of Teitelbaum Furs could
logically be applied to misdemeanor as well as felony convictions. However, practical consid-
erations make this undesirable").
120. 173 Cal. App. 3d 713, 219 Cal. Rptr. 272 (1985).
121. Id. at 720, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 278 (citations omitted).
122. Id. at 720-21, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 278 (quoting Crowall, 118 Wis. 2d at 126, 346
N.W.2d at 331).
123. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 comment e (1982).
124. Id. In fairness to the Sims majority, it should be noted that the "opportunity to
litigate" question has baffled courts of appeal in other contexts. Courts have disagreed
whether an order granting a motion that finally resolves a pending action constitutes a suffi-
cient "opportunity to litigate" such that the first action will bar a subsequent action. All
courts focus, however, on whether the subsequent action raises issues identical to those of the
prior action. See Barker v. Hull, 191 Cal. App. 3d 221, 226, 236 Cal. Rptr. 285, 288-89 (1987);
Rohrbasser v. Lederer, 179 Cal. App. 3d 290, 297, 224 Cal. Rptr. 791, 794 (1986); Rose v.
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The counterargument is, of course, that the SSDSC did not with-
draw its restitution letter and Sims consequently was entitled to a hearing
and a determination. The question in Sims was not the validity of the
fair hearing outcome, but whether a finding based on such a flawed rec-
ord should be given conclusive effect in a far more serious judicial pro-
ceeding. Justice Kaus' dissent on this point is compelling:
Since the county did not appeal the administrative decision, it is, of
course, bound by the terms of that ruling. Thus, the county is obli-
gated to refund any restitution payments defendant made pursuant to
the agency's directions and to rescind its administrative "Notice of Ac-
tion." At the same time, however, because the county did not "actu-
ally litigate" the fraud question in the administrative proceeding, the
majority has simply disregarded the well-established contours of the
collateral estoppel doctrine in holding that the People are precluded
from proving defendant's guilt in this separate "cause of action"-the
criminal prosecution. 125
The SSDSC's decision to cast its lot with the criminal prosecution
worked an economy at the fair hearing, contributed to reversal of Sims'
restitution order to her advantage, and effectively allowed her to either
escape restitution altogether or face it only upon conviction in a proceed-
ing in which her adversary would have to prove the cohabitation allega-
tion beyond a reasonable doubt. There was no corresponding
disadvantage to Sims beyond that of a small time investment. She appar-
ently had no attorney at the fair hearing, although that is not clear from
the court's opinion, and, as a welfare recipient, she would almost cer-
tainly have been entitled to appointed counsel in the criminal
proceeding. 126
Although not discussed by the Sims majority, the California
Supreme Court, in the case of In re Dennis B. 127 took a very different
position in a related area. To prevent harassment of the accused, Califor-
nia Penal Code section 654 generally precludes successive prosecutions
for different crimes arising out of the same transaction, 128 whatever the
Fuqua, 200 Cal. App. 2d 719, 722, 19 Cal. Rptr. 634, 636 (1962); Preston v. Wyo. Pac. Oil
Co., 197 Cal. App. 2d 517, 528, 17 Cal. Rptr. 443, 449 (1961); Darlington v. Basalt Rock Co.,
188 Cal. App. 2d 706, 709, 10 Cal. Rptr. 556, 557 (1961).
125. Sims, 32 Cal. 3d at 491-92, 651 P.2d at 336, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 91 (Kaus, J.,
dissenting).
126. CAL. PENAL CODE § 987 et. seq. (West 1985). It is conceivable that a wealthy indi-
vidual might commit welfare fraud and not be eligible for appointed counsel, of course.
127. 18 Cal. 3d 687, 557 P.2d 514, 135 Cal. Rptr. 82 (1976).
128. CAL. PENAL CODE § 654 (West 1985). If, for example, the victim dies after the
defendant is convicted of assault, prosecution for homicide is not precluded. People v. Bre-
land, 243 Cal. App. 2d 644, 650, 52 Cal. Rptr. 696, 760 (1966). That did not occur in Dennis
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outcome of the first prosecution. Dennis B. was accused successively of
an unsafe lane change, an infraction, and vehicular manslaughter, a mis-
demeanor, arising out of the same accident. He was tried, convicted, and
fined $10 on the first charge and sought to preclude prosecution of the
second per section 654.129
The parties in both prosecutions were identical, as was the driving
error underlying each charge. The supreme court, however, denied sec-
tion 654 preclusion giving reasons strikingly similar to those Justice
Kaus expresses in his Sims dissent.130 First, although technically the re-
sponsibility of the district attorney, the routine prosecution of traffic tick-
ets was essentially a police matter. The only evidence that.the district
attorney's office was aware of the unsafe lane change prosecution was its
issuance of subpoenas for the trial, a routine clerical function.131 Second,
the traffic ticket prosecution was de minimis and offered little threat of
harassment. As was the case with the Sims' fair hearing, "an infraction[,
the unsafe lane change,] is not punishable by confinement, and generally
no stigma is attached thereto."' 132 Third, "the state's substantial interest
in maintaining the summary nature of minor motor vehicle violation pro-
ceedings would be impaired by requiring the prosecution to ascertain for
each infraction the possibility of further criminal proceedings."' 133 Fi-
nally, "[t]here is an undeniable state interest in prosecuting serious mis-
demeanors and felonies. To permit defendant to be prosecuted only for a
minor motor vehicle code infraction when his alleged crime was actually
manslaughter 'would operate with gross unfairness to the state.' "134
From a practical and public policy perspective, Sims and In re Den-
nis B. appear irreconcilable. True, there are considerably more traffic
trials than welfare fair hearings, but at least a district attorney's office
could computerize its own files to discover and coordinate parallel filings.
The Sims decision, on the other hand, assumes the office of the district
129. Dennis B., 18 Cal. 3d at 690, 557 P.2d at 516, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 84.
130. Sims, 32 Cal. 3d 468, 404-95, 651 P.2d 321, 337-38, 186 Cal. Rptr. 77, 93-94 (1982)
(Kaus, J., dissenting).
131. Dennis B., 18 Cal. 3d at 693, 557 P.2d at 518, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 86. In People v. Bas,
194 Cal. App. 3d 878, 882, 241 Cal. Rptr. 299, 301 (1987), however, the court of appeal held a
felony prosecution was barred after the defendant pleaded guilty to misdemeanor violations
arising out of the same incident. The misdemeanor pleas were entered at the preliminary
hearing on the felony charges with the concurrence of the prosecutor after defense counsel
openly announced he would claim convictions on the lesser offenses would bar further
prosecution.
132. Dennis B., 18 Cal. 3d at 694-95, 557 P.2d at 519, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 87.
133. Id. at 695, 557 P.2d at 520, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 88.
134. Id. at 696, 557 P.2d at 520, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 88 (quoting State v. Currie, 41 N.J. 531,
543, 197 A.2d 678, 685 (1945)).
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attorney can somehow monitor proceedings in various other agencies of
which it will generally not have a reasonable opportunity to inform itself,
much less control. Moreover, although only a "serious misdemeanor"
was at stake in Dennis B. that prosecution was not affected by a previous
judicial determination. In Sims, on the other hand, a felony prosecution
was precluded by a decision after an informal administrative
proceeding. 35
B. Final Determination on the Merits
Collateral estoppel cannot apply to determinations not yet final for
the very obvious reason that they might be changed, causing chain-reac-
tion chaos in parallel proceedings that have adopted the interlocutory
judgments of other adjudicators. As suggested above, it is likely the fair
hearing decision in Sims was "on the merits" only in the sense that a
default judgment is considered to be on the merits. The facts given in
Sims, however, are probably inadequate to resolve the issue either way.
An important feature of administrative adjudication is that agency
decisions are often subject to revision, reconsideration, or judicial review
for considerable periods of time. 136 The Sims opinion tacitly concedes
the trial court's application of collateral estoppel was not proper because
it came during the SSDSC's one year period to seek mandamus review in
the superior court. 137 The court is not receptive to Sims' claim that the
cause should be considered final as of the date the director adopted the
hearing officer's decision: "[I]t is a well established rule that only judg-
ments which are free from direct attack are final and may not be reliti-
gated."' 38 Nevertheless, the court narrowly avoids this difficulty by
noting a fact probably beyond the appellate record. The year in which to
file the petition had lapsed with no mandamus relief having been sought.
Thus, because no petition had been filed the court finds it unnecessary to
determine whether the decision might have become final any earlier. 139
135. Sims, 32 Cal. 3d at 490, 651 P.2d at 334-35, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 90. An interesting
question the court did not reach in Dennis B. was whether trial of the infraction precluded
relitigation of the fact of the unsafe lane change. A jury trial was not available in either pro-
ceeding, and the burden of proof was the same in both. It is clear the juvenile court referee
was aware of the conviction. 18 Cal. 3d at 697 n.7, 557 P.2d at 521 n.7, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 89
n.7. But it does not appear he made an independent finding on the issue. It would seem the
reasons given by the supreme court for denying Penal Code section 654 preclusion would
apply to a prosecution attempt to invoke collateral estoppel there or under similar circum-
stances, for example, in cases such as Sims.
136. See e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 10962 (West 1980).
137. Sims, 32 Cal. 3d at 486, 651 P.2d at 332, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 88.
138. Id. at 486, 651 P.2d at 332, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 88.
139. Id.
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Reading between the lines, the court apparently seizes upon the only
avenue legally available to avoid the finality problem.140 Yet, in its treat-
ment of the finality issue, the court virtually guarantees no welfare recipi-
ent who prevails at a fair hearing will ever be able to seek refuge from a
determined prosecutor via collateral estoppel. Most prosecutions will
commence, as in Sims, when the evidence of overpayment comes to light,
that is, at or about the time of the fair hearing. Therefore, a prosecutor
faced with a collateral estoppel attack only need persuade the county
welfare agency to seek judicial review in order to avoid administrative
finality. That usually will provide a leeway of two or three years to con-
clude a parallel criminal prosecution.141
If the defendant is convicted, he or she also may appeal. An appel-
late court entertaining both the criminal and the administrative appeals
would be faced with an interesting dilemma: does the appeal decided
first control? 42 If the cases are consolidated and both judgments would
ordinarily be affirmed, as perhaps would have been the case in Sims, does
one supersede the other? For example does the conviction supersede be-
cause of the higher burden of proof? Once the parallel proceedings have
cleared the fact finding level, perhaps the better rule is that they should
each proceed on the merits without regard to the other, notwithstanding
the possibility of inconsistent determinations. 143
140. Finality is one of the greatest impediments to the use of administrative collateral
estoppel in general. As one commentator observed, "Many agencies have procedures for re-
considering or modifying final decisions. If a court gives collateral estoppel effect to the
agency's findings before reconsideration is completed, the court's decision may not comport
with the agency's final decision on reconsideration." Note, The Collateral Estoppel Effect of
Administrative Agency Actions in Federal Civil Litigation, 46 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 65, 75
(1977) (authored by Eric N. Macey).
141. If the recipient is unsuccessful at the fair hearing, now the first stage of the criminal
proceeding in Justice Kaus' view, (see supra note 108) should the prosecution be abated per the
abstention doctrine pending the statutorily authorized judicial review of the fair hearing? See,
e.g., Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Dayton Christian Schools, Inc., 477 U.S. 619, 629 (1986);
Note, supra note 63, at 1507-08.
142. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 909 (West 1980 & Supp. 1988) would permit an appellate
court to take evidence itself in the mandamus proceeding and reverse the director on its own
factual findings. It provides in part, "In all [nonjury trials], the reviewing court may make
factual determinations contrary to those made by the trial court. The factual determinations
may be based on the evidence adduced before the trial court either with or without the taking
of evidence by the reviewing court." Id. The section is apparently unknown to most practi-
tioners, however, and is rarely used in situations in which it would seemingly be fully applica-
ble. See, e.g., Shamblin v. Brattain, 44 Cal. 3d 474, 479, 749 P.2d 339, 341-42, 243 Cal. Rptr.
902, 905 (1988) (appellate courts should defer to trial court factual findings even on review of
motions heard on declarations); In re Elise K., 33 Cal. 3d 138, 149-51, 654 P.2d 253, 261-62,
187 Cal. Rptr. 483, 491-92 (1982) (Bird, C.J., concurring) (It is the province of the trial court
to resolve questions of fact and of the appellate court to decide questions of law).
143. See, e.g., NLRB v. Deena Artware, 198 F.2d 645, 650 (6th Cir. 1952), cert. denied,
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Although one of the important purposes of collateral estoppel is the
avoidance of inconsistent results, in the Sims scenario, an inconsistency
would be perfectly defensible because one of the parties refused to par-
ticipate in the fair hearing. Even had the cause been fully litigated, in-
consistent results would have been easily explainable in Sims based on
the informality of the fair hearing procedure and the lack of attorney
participation.
C. Privity of the Parties
As noted above, collateral estoppel generally can apply only against
a party or someone in privity with a party. The rationale is obvious. It is
one thing to lose on the merits; it is quite another to lose because some-
one who may have had less reason to pursue a claim involving the same
issue, and over whom you have no control or influence, has already lost
on the merits.
In an identical context only three years before Sims, the court of
appeal in People v. LaMotte found no privity between county prosecutors
and welfare representatives. 14 4 The court stated, "Appellant combines
the Santa Cruz District Attorney and its Welfare Department as the
'party' to be estopped. This position ignores the fact that the People of
the State of California and not the County of Santa Cruz or its district
attorney are the plaintiff in the criminal case."' 14 5
In Sims the supreme court responds to LaMotte in two ways. First,
it decides that the court of appeal's analysis was too "simplistic,"' 14 6 and
uses a circular reply, itself deserving a harsher label. Quoting from an-
other court of appeal opinion, the court states, " 'Privity is essentially a
shorthand statement that collateral estoppel is to be applied in a given
case; there is no universally applicable definition of privity.' '147 Second,
the court indicates that the county prosecutor and the welfare depart-
ment were in privity: "At fair hearings, the county welfare department
[also] acts as the 'agent' of the state."' 148 The court points out that the
345 U.S. 906 (1953); United Brick & Clay Workers v. Deena Artware, 198 F.2d 637, 642-43
(6th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 897, reh'g denied, 344 U.S. 919 (1953).
144. 92 Cal. App. 3d 604, 608, 155 Cal. Rptr. 5, 9 (1979).
145. Id.
146. Sims, 32 Cal. 3d at 486, 651 P.2d at 332, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 88.
147. Id. at 486, 651 P.2d at 332-33, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 88 (quoting Lynch v. Glass, 44 Cal.
App. 3d 943, 947, 119 Cal. Rptr. 139, 141-42 (1975)).
148. Id. at 487, 651 P.2d at 333, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 89 (footnote omitted); but see Clemmer
v. Hartford Ins. Co., 22 Cal. 3d 865, 873-77, 587 P.2d 1098, 1101-04. 151 Cal. Rptr. 285, 288-
90 (1978) (doctrine of collateral estoppel did not preclude plaintiffs from litigating the issue of
whether defendant's insured, previously convicted of second degree murder in the death of
plaintiffs' decedent, acted willfully, even though conviction would so estop the insured).
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DSS supervises every phase of the administration of welfare and social
services and, quoting Lerner v. Los Angeles City Board of Education,
adds, "'the courts have held that the agents of the same government are
in privity with each other, since they represent not their own rights but.
the rights of the government.' "1149
Lerner, however, is entirely distinguishable. The Lerner court
noted, "Not only does the city board here serve as an agency of the state
but.., the city board occupied a totally dependent and subordinate posi-
tion to the state board, basing its decisions entirely upon the state board's
[action] ... -150 In other words, the agencies in Lerner were part of the
same hierarchy; and the lower was obviously an agent of the higher.
This was not, of course, the case in Sims.
The Lerner analogy is also imperfect for several other reasons. It
may be that the DSS and the SSDSC are in privity, although they play
entirely different roles in the fair hearing procedure; but the real question
is whether either is in privity with the district attorney. It hardly can be
said the DSS is the alter ego of the People of the State of California in a
criminal prosecution or even that it has a similar interest. The DSS sup-
plies the hearing officer, and its director makes the final determination.151
Thus, the director of the DSS is an adjudicator in fair hearings, not an
advocate. The local welfare agency, here the SSDSC, has the role of ad-
vocate. By contrast, a county prosecutor, although he does appear on
behalf of the state, is under the supervision of the attorney general in
felony matters.152 The attorney general, however, never acts in a judicial
capacity.
Additionally, the relationship between the attorney general and a
county prosecutor differs from that between the DSS and a county wel-
fare agency. The DSS exercises considerably less control over local agen-
cies than the attorney general can over county prosecutors. The DSS
may not arbitrarily intervene in the affairs of local agencies: "If the di-
rector believes that a county is substantially failing to comply with any
provision of [the California Welfare and Institutions Code] or any regula-
149. Sims, 32 Cal. 3d at 487, 651 P.2d at 333, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 89 (quoting Lerner v. Los
Angeles City Bd. of Educ., 59 Cal. 2d 382, 398, 380 P.2d 97, 106, 29 Cal. Rptr. 657, 666
(1963)); see also Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 402-04 (1940) (hold-
ing that there is privity between different officers of the United States government with respect
to a given party).
150. Lerner, 59 Cal. 2d at 398-99, 380 P.2d at 106, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 666.
151. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 10953, 10959 (West 1980).
152. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12550 (West 1980) gives the Attorney General "direct supervi-
sion over the district attorneys of the several counties of the State and [he] may... assist any
district attorney in the discharge of his duties, and may, where he deems it necessary, take full
charge of any investigation or prosecution of violations of law ...."
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tion... and the director determines that formal action may be necessary
to secure compliance, he or she shall inform the county welfare director
and the board of supervisors .... ,,153 Thereafter, unlike the attorney
general dealing with a recalcitrant county attorney, 154 the director must
seek compliance by an action for injunctive relief or order the county to
appear at a hearing before the State Social Services Advisory Board.
Only then may the director take action similar to that peremptorily avail-
able to the Attorney General, and even then the director's action is sub-
ject to judicial review.155
Although Sims also relies on a "close association" between the
SSDSC and the district attorney "in investigating and controlling welfare
fraud," 156 it is by no means certain the same is true in all, or even most,
of the other counties in the state. Moreover, the court points to no pro-
cedure authorizing a district attorney to supervise a welfare agency's
handling of a fair hearing. 157 As one commentator defined it, "[p]rivity
exists [when] a nonparty has a sufficient interest in, participation in, or
control of the prior litigation to make the determination in that litigation
binding on him."' 158 If the nonparty in Sims is viewed as the district
attorney, rather than the state itself, it is doubtful that this standard is
met.
The more expansive view of privity espoused in Sims parallels the
federal rule, which focuses on the issue litigated, rather than the interests
of the governmental agencies involved. For example, in Sunshine An-
thracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, a judgment in an action between a company
and the National Bituminous Coal Commission as to the nature of the
coal the company produced was held to preclude relitigation of the same
issue in a subsequent suit brought by the Collector of Internal Reve-
nue. 159 The United States Supreme Court determined federal officers are
in privity for purposes of collateral estoppel when the public representa-
tive in the first action was authorized to represent the government "in a
final adjudication of the issue in controversy."'160 By contrast, in United
153. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 10605 (West 1980 & Supp. 1989).
154. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
155. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 10605 (West 1980 & Supp. 1989).
156. Sims, 32 Cal. 3d at 487, 651 P.2d at 333, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 89.
157. Justice Kaus' dissent also appears to assume some power on the district attorney's
part to exercise such control, however. Id. at 493-94, 651 P.2d at 336-37, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 93
(Kaus, J., dissenting).
158. Note, supra note 140, at 80 (citing 1B J. MOORE, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE r
0.411[l] (2d ed. 1974)).
159. 310 U.S. 381, 402-03 (1940).
160. Id. at 403.
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States v. RCA' 61 the Court held an FCC licensing decision did not estop
an antitrust action based on the acquisition of a television station because
the FCC was not chartered for the purpose of enforcing antitrust policy;
that is, the same issues were not before the two agencies involved.162
Since the SSDSC was authorized to litigate the question of overpay-
ments to Sims, it appears application of the federal privity rule in Sun-
shine Anthracite Coal would have supported the use of collateral
estoppel.' 63 If the federal test were applied broadly in California, how-
ever, that could lead to the use of collateral estoppel in a wide variety of
criminal cases involving previous administrative determinations from the
Department of Motor Vehicles, the Department of Real Estate, and
other agencies and licensing boards. As Justice Kaus notes, the legisla-
ture hardly could have envisioned that scenario in creating these admin-
istrative bodies and authorizing their adjudicatory functions.' 64
IV. Sims' Conclusion and Public Policy
Sims concludes with an exercise in self-congratulation. The court
declares its opinion furthers the public policy underpinnings of collateral
estoppel by promoting judicial economy, avoiding inconsistent results,
protecting the sanctity of the fair hearing process, and preventing harass-
ment of welfare recipients. 165 The court also discovers overriding legisla-
tive preference for resolving welfare fraud cases outside the criminal
justice system and suggests its holding conforms to that preference. 166
161. 358 U.S. 334 (1959).
162. Id. at 352; See Note, Res Judicata and Administrative Jurisdiction-A Proposal for
Resolving Conflicts Between Agencies with Overlapping Jurisdiction, 35 GEo. WASH. L. REv.
1056, 1057-58 (1967) (authored by Carol P. Kelley and Mary Margaret Milner).
163. See also Univ. of Tenn. v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 789 (1986) (where the parties had an
opportunity to litigate the issues, findings of fact by a state agency acting in a judicial capacity
are entitled to the same preclusive effect in federal court as they would have in state court).
164. Sims, 32 Cal. 3d at 493, 651 P.2d at 337, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 92 (Kaus, J., dissenting).
165. Id.at 488-89, 651 P.2d at 334, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 89-90.
166. Id. at 475, 651 P.2d at 325, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 81. This contention must have frus-
trated prosecutors. The legislature provided specific penal statutes for Sims' alleged miscon-
duct. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 11483 (West 1980); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 18910
(West 1980) (repealed 1979). They were presumably enacted for a purpose. Sims' dubious
rationale springs from People v. McGee, 19 Cal. 3d 948, 568 P.2d 382, 140 Cal. Rptr. 657
(1977), interpreting a legislative provision (CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 11483 (West
1980))-subsequently considerably narrowed in scope to very minor cases-requiring a de-
mand for restitution before the commencement of a criminal prosecution. The statute did not
preclude prosecution even if restitution was made, however, and the McGee court noted, "We
do not mean to suggest, of course, that the Legislature viewed welfare fraud as a nonserious
crime .... " 19 Cal. 3d at 965, 568 P.2d at 391, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 666; see also People v.
Jordan, 86 Cal. App. 3d 529, 536-37, 150 Cal. Rptr. 334, 338 (1978) (information properly
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In its efforts to serve the public policy concerns of collateral estop-
pel, however, the court dismisses some equally important considerations.
Perhaps the strongest objections to the use of collateral estoppel in any
setting are injustice, surprise, potential perpetuation of an earlier error,
and untoward effects on the original tribunal. 167 None of these factors is
given appropriate consideration by the Sims majority, although all are
present when one examines the history of the litigation and its probable
impact. Specifically, the use of collateral estoppel in Sims was unfair
and, in view of Empire Star Mines, was not readily foreseeable by the
county litigants. 1 68 The Sims majority simply ignores Justice Kaus'
warning concerning the potential hardship on the DSS and other similar
agencies who might have their streamlined informal proceedings turned
into arenas for the indirect resolution of causes far more significant than
they were designed to accommodate.
A. Injustice and the Perpetuation of Legal Error
Sims ignores (and thereby casts doubt on) well established authority
barring the use of collateral estoppel on the grounds of unfairness.
Although not part of the Sims and Utah Construction standards, fairness
historically has played a part in the better reasoned collateral estoppel
cases, even those involving only defensive preclusion. As the United
States Supreme Court stated, "[N]o one set of facts, no one collection of
words or phrases, will provide an automatic formula for proper rulings
on estoppel pleas. In the end, [the] decision will necessarily rest on the
trial courts' sense of justice and equity." 169
The Sims result was unjust because the case against Sims never was
presented anywhere. The SSDSC thought the criminal prosecution pre-
empted the fair hearing, perceiving the matter exactly backward as it
dismissed when the defendant was given no opportunity to make restitution before arrest and
prosecution).
167. Even where a vigorous application of collateral estoppel would tend to cause an
early termination of litigation, other persuasive reasons can be found for not applying
it. Of primary import is the doctrine that each person shall be accorded his full day
in court. Additional factors include both the difficulty of foreseeing the possible sig-
nificance in future cases of matters being currently litigated and recognition that so-
cial and legislative policies in certain areas of substantive law tend to make flexibility
of decision more desirable than merely ending litigation.
Polasky, Collateral Estoppel-Effects of Prior Litigation, 39 IowA L. REV. 217, 221 (1954)
(footnotes omitted).
168. Empire Star Mines Co. v. Cal. Employment Comm'n, 28 Cal. 2d 33, 48, 168 P.2d
686, 695 (1946) (for the defense of res judicata to operate as an estoppel there must be a
judgement rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction).
169. Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 333-34
(1971).
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turned out; and the criminal prosecution was barred by collateral estop-
pel. The state (viz. the taxpayers) never had a day in either forum.
Assuming the DSS made the correct determination, that Sims had
not cohabited while receiving welfare, the still birth of the criminal prose-
cution is not so difficult to accept. Hopefully, there truly was nothing to
gain in proceeding with her criminal trial. But what if the fair hearing
result was wrong? Collateral estoppel is strong legal medicine because,
like full faith and credit, res judicata, and even law of the case, it can
preclude relitigation of an issue even when the earlier decision was
clearly erroneous. 170 That was the situation in Hollywood Circle.
Whether legally compelled or not, the result was highly unjust.171
Although Sims did not involve the perpetuation of an error of law via
collateral estoppel, a brief exposition of California law on the point is
useful background to understand the implications of the decision.
The leading texts on the subject, the Restatement (Second) of Judg-
ments and Professor Davis' treatise on administrative law, advocate a
flexible approach. The Restatement suggests the second forum should
consider whether
the prior determination was plainly wrong or ... [whether] new evi-
dence [is] available .... Further, it is unnecessary ... [to show] ...
that the evidence could not have been discovered with due diligence;
the question is not whether a prior determination should be set aside
but whether it should be . . . treated as conclusive for further
purposes.' 72
Professor Davis concludes collateral estoppel should be "qualified or re-
laxed to whatever extent is desirable for making it a proper and useful
tool for administrative justice."' 73 He also notes circumstances in which
preclusion should not be permitted because of the potential impact on
third persons or the public interest. 174
When relitigation is requested because of a change in legal interpre-
tation, the case for allowing preclusion may be even more compelling.
Generally, it makes sense to deny relitigation after a law is amended for
170. See, e.g., Clemente v. State, 40 Cal. 3d 202, 211, 707 P.2d 818, 823, 219 Cal. Rptr.
445, 450 (1985); Hollywood Circle, Inc. v. Dep't of Alcohol Beverage Control, 55 Cal. 2d 728,
733, 361 P.2d 712, 715, 13 Cal. Rptr. 104, 107 (1961); ef City and County of San Francisco v.
Padilla, 23 Cal. App. 3d 388, 397, 100 Cal. Rptr. 223, 233 (1972) (decision of Board of Permit
Appeals in excess of its jurisdiction may be attacked collaterally).
171. See supra notes 30-38 and accompanying text.
172. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29 comment j (1982).
173. 2 K. C. DAVIS, supra note 13, § 18.03, at 559.
174. Id. at 561-66. See Louis Stores, Inc. v. Dep't of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 57 Cal.
2d 749, 758, 371 P.2d 758, 762, 22 Cal. Rptr. 14, 18 (1962) (finding both public interest and
effect on third parties).
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reasons of policy or preference by the legislature or the courts. A con-
trary rule would be extremely costly and a disincentive to legal reform.
But when the initial decision is subsequently discovered to be erroneous
under existing law, preclusion serves to perpetuate an injustice that is
difficult to justify in the name of judicial economy.
For example, in Slater v. Blackwood17 5 a minor whose first personal
injury action was nonsuited and affirmed on appeal based on the guest
statute sought to relitigate the question after the supreme court declared
the law unconstitutional. The court rejected the second action, finding
the doctrine of discretionary refusal to apply res judicata to be of doubt-
ful validity and specifically "inapplicable where . . . the only possible
basis for its implementation is ... a change in law following the original
judgment."1 76  Unfortunately, the court appears to have confused
changes in the law with legal errors. A declaration of unconstitutionality
is more than a change in the law; it also reveals a declaration that previ-
ous holdings reaching contrary conclusions were decided wrongly. In
Slater, 177 however, the court ignored any such distinction in Draconian
language. It stated the rule that "final judgments, even erroneous ones,
are a bar to further proceedings ... is necessary to the well-ordered func-
tioning of the judicial process. It should not be impaired for the benefit
of particular plaintiffs, regardless of the sympathy their plight might
arouse in an individual case."' 178  Justice cried out, however, for the
175. 15 Cal. 3d 791, 794, 543 P.2d 593, 594, 126 Cal. Rptr. 225, 226 (1975).
176. Id. at 796, 543 P.2d at 595, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 227. California historically also has
recognized an exception to the usual rules of preclusion when circumstances have changed.
Clark v. Yosemite Community College Dist., 785 F.2d 781, 788-89 (9th Cir. 1986); Lockwood
v. Superior Court, 160 Cal. App. 3d 667, 673-74, 206 Cal. Rptr. 785, 788 (1984); Melendres v.
City of Los Angeles, 40 Cal. App. 3d 718, 730, 115 Cal. Rptr. 409, 417 (1974); People v. Ocean
Shore R.R., 32 Cal. 2d 406, 418-19, 196 P.2d 570, 578-79 (1948). The passage cited in the text
casts doubt on the continuing vitality of the exception to these rules, however. McGaffey v.
Sudowitz, 189 Cal. App. 2d 215, 10 Cal. Rptr. 862 (1961), one of the decisions questioned in
Slater, was a changed circumstances case.
177. Slater also notes agency decisions may collaterally estop courts and vice versa, citing
an earlier decision to that effect, whether or not thefirst decision was correct. 15 Cal. 3d at 797,
543 P.2d at 596, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 228 (citing Busick v. Workmens' Compensation Appeals
Bd., 7 Cal. 3d 967, 975, 500 P.2d 1386, 1392-93, 104 Cal. Rptr. 42, 48 (1972). In Busick a
superior court judgment was given binding effect on the Workmen's Compensation Appeals
Board. The supreme court in that case made it abundantly clear the decision of either forum
would bind the other: "We recognize that the two tribunals in which petitioner sought relief
have concurrent jurisdiction [but] only to determine jurisdiction . . . '[T]he tribunal first as-
suming jurisdiction retains it to the exclusion of all other tribunals in which the action might
have been initiated."' 7 Cal. 3d at 976, 500 P.2d at 1393, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 49 (citing Scott v.
Indus. Accident Comm'n, 46 Cal. 2d 76, 81, 293 P.2d 18, 21 (1956); Jones v. Brown, 13 Cal.
App. 3d 513, 521, 89 Cal. Rptr. 651, 655-56 (1970)).




Slater court to allow relitigation of those cases in which minors were
involved. This is so because minors may generally bring tort action dur-
ing the period of their minority or up until one year thereafter. Penaliz-
ing minors whose well-meaning guardians brought suit prematurely
borders on the aberrational. Those cases involving adults, with a few
additional exceptions, would have been precluded by California's one-
year statute of limitations for personal injury claims. 179
Still, it may be too early to scatter the ashes of the notion that a
court may reject preclusion when injustice will result, at least where the
earlier error is merely one of law. Without mentioning Slater or
Hollywood Circle, the supreme court in Consumers Lobby Against Mo-
nopolies v. Public Utilities Commission stated, "[W]hen the issue is a
question of law rather than of fact, the prior determination is not conclu-
sive either if injustice would result or if the public interest requires that
relitigation not be foreclosed."' 180 The court cited two cases for this
proposition, both of which predated Slater but were not noted there. 181
Later, however, the supreme court, in an opinion by the author of Con-
sumers Lobby, followed Slater and Hollywood Circle on the point.1 82
Although cited and not specifically overruled, Consumers Lobby was ap-
parently questioned by the supreme court.183 The continuing refusal of
the court to adopt a consistent position in this and numerous other issues
in the preclusion field is both puzzling and a source of unnecessary
litigation.184
179. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 340 (West 1982).
180. 25 Cal. 3d 891, 902, 603 P.2d. 41, 47, 160 Cal. Rptr. 124, 130.
181. Id. at 902, 603 P.2d at 47, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 130. City of Los Angeles v. City of San
Fernando, 14 Cal. 3d 199, 230, 537 P.2d 1250, 1273, 123 Cal. Rptr. 1, 24 (1975); Louis Stores,
Inc. v. Dep't of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 57 Cal. 2d 749, 757, 371 P.2d 758, 762, 22 Cal.
Rptr. 14, 18 (1962).
182. Moffat v. Moffat, 27 Cal. 3d 645, 653-58, 612 P.2d 967, 972-74, 165 Cal. Rptr. 877,
882-84 (1980).
183. Id. at 656, 612 P.2d at 973, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 883.
184. The reaction of the courts of appeal, predictably, has been mixed. Following Con-
sumers Lobby (or acknowledging vitality of the rule permitting relitigation of erroneous legal
interpretation): People v. Superior Court (Lucero), 198 Cal. App. 3d 1038, 1043-44, 244 Cal.
Rptr. 502, 504-05 (1988); Carmel Valley Fire Protection Dist. v. State, 190 Cal. App. 3d 521,
536, 537 n.10, 234 Cal. Rptr. 795, 804 (1987); Rutherford v. State, 188 Cal. App. 3d 1267,
1283, 233 Cal. Rptr. 781, 789 (1987); City of Watsonville v. Merrill, 137 Cal. App. 3d 185,
194-95, 186 Cal. Rptr. 857, 862-63 (1982); see also Clark v. Yosemite Community College
Dist., 785 F.2d 781, 788 (9th Cir. 1986) (applying Slater narrowly). Following Slater In re
Marriage of Fellers, 125 Cal. App. 3d 254, 257, 178 Cal. Rptr. 35, 37 (1981); Smith v. Brovan,
97 Cal. App. 3d 19, 24, 158 Cal. Rptr. 515, 518-19 (1979). Distinguishing or rejecting Slater
J.R. Norton Co. v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd., 192 Cal. App. 3d 874, 910, 238 Cal.
Rptr. 87, 109 (1987) (Kaufman, J., concurring and dissenting); Ruddock v. Ohls, 91 Cal. App.
3d 271, 280-81, 154 Cal. Rptr. 87, 93 (1979); Carroll v. Puritan Leasing Co., 77 Cal. App. 3d
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The rule of Consumers Lobby, although greatly preferable to that of
Slater, is itself harsher than that of other, perhaps more enlightened ju-
risdictions. Many courts and commentators have adopted the flexible
approach advocated by Professor Davis and the Restatement of Judg-
ments. 185 It appears most would permit considerable trial court discre-
tion whether the issue is one of fact or law, although discretion to correct
errors of law is generally thought to be broader. 8 6 Collateral estoppel
and its cousins are judicial creations. To create suffocating rules to be
rigidly enforced is undesirable in light of the certainty of unanticipated
future events. Concepts designed to promote justice and avoid duplica-
tion need not be couched in absolute terms in order to accomplish their
goals in a high percentage of cases. Law itself is little more than a study
of exceptions to rules.
B. The Element of Surprise
Another troublesome aspect of the Sims opinion is lack of foresee-
ability, or "the element of surprise." The application of collateral estop-
pel to the decision of a hearing officer after an uncontested proceeding
before an agency constitutionally prohibited from exercising judicial
power-particularly when the county litigant was not officially subject to
the control of the district attorney-would not have been expected by
many. 187 Most would have anticipated a judicial reaction along the lines
of Empire Star Mines or the Demery and LaMotte decisions. 188
Sims' failure to consider the element of surprise is not unique.
Many issue preclusion cases ignore the question of whether litigants
should have expected an initial determination would bind them at other
481, 488-89, 143 Cal. Rptr. 772, 778 (1978); Hight v. Hight, 67 Cal. App. 3d 498, 502-03, 136
Cal. Rptr. 685, 687 (1977).
185. See Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 597-99 (1948); Title v. INS, 322 F.2d 21,
23-24 (9th Cir. 1963); Note, supra note 140, at 69.
186. See Rutherford v. State, 188 Cal. App. 3d 1267, 1284, 233 Cal. Rptr. 781, 790 (1987);
Tar Land Villas Owners' Ass'n v. Atlantic Beach, 64 N.C. App. 239, 245, 307 S.E.2d 181, 185-
86 (1983); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 28(2) & reporter's note at 286 (1982).
187. People v. Sims, 32 Cal. 3d 468, 651 P.2d 321, 186 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1982).
188. Empire Star Mines Co. v. Cal. Employment Comm'n, 28 Cal. 2d 33, 168 P.2d 686
(1946) (doctrine of res judicata is unavailable in connection with administrative proceedings);
People v. Demery, 104 Cal. App. 3d 548, 163 Cal. Rptr. 816 (1980) (defendant's successful
litigation in an administrative hearing does not bar subsequent criminal prosecution); People v.
LaMotte, 92 Cal. App. 3d 604, 155 Cal. Rptr. 5 (1979) (that a claim raises an issue within the
expertise of an administrative agency does not affect the primary jurisdiction of the California
judiciary). Ironically, one district attorney's office that may not have been totally surprised
was the one in charge of Sims' prosecution; it is possible the SSDSC's decision not to litigate on
jurisdictional grounds was taken at the suggestion of the district attorney in order to avoid
potential preclusion. The surprise was that collateral estoppel was applied notwithstanding.
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times and places, 189 and it is not part of either the federal or California
test. But many commentators and a number of jurists, including
Learned Hand, have argued foreseeability should be a major considera-
tion in preclusion cases. 190 Judge Hand noted, "Were the law to be re-
cast, it would... be a pertinent inquiry whether the conclusiveness... of
facts decided ... might not properly be limited to future controversies
which could be thought reasonably in prospect when the first suit was
tried."'191 Although the criminal prosecution in Sims was already under-
way when the fair hearing was held,192 the application of collateral estop-
pel after the SSDSC declined to litigate was not readily foreseeable.
In Lewis v. International Business Machines Corp., 193 a case similar
to Sims, the district judge considered lack of foreseeability to be an im-
portant concern. Lewis was a wrongful discharge diversity action in
which the law of Oregon was applicable. The plaintiff applied for state
unemployment benefits, and IBM demanded a hearing to challenge the
application. The hearing was conducted in two sessions, the first in Ne-
vada and the second in Oregon. Only a maximum benefit of $1,612 was
at stake; and Lewis, who had since moved to Nevada, did not attend the
hearing in Oregon and was not represented by counsel or anyone else.
His claim was denied. When he brought his district court action seeking
$500,000 in damages, IBM moved for summary judgment on collateral
estoppel grounds. 194
The court noted that Oregon at one time did not apply collateral
estoppel to agency adjudications, but presently did. 195 Nevertheless,
IBM's motion was denied. First, the district judge reasoned the plaintiff
lacked a serious incentive to litigate his unemployment insurance claim
because of the small amount of money involved. Consequently it would
be unfair to apply collateral estoppel. 196 Second, the judge in Lewis
189. See People v. Taylor, 12 Cal. 3d 686, 527 P.2d 622, 117 Cal. Rptr. 70 (1974); see also
Bernhard v. Bank of Am., 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942).
190. "When according estoppel effect to agency findings would foster harsh, unforeseeable
effects, the court should invoke the judicially recognized principle of applying collateral estop-
pel flexibly to avoid injustice." Note, supra note 140, at 83-84; Polasky, supra note 167, at 221;
Grandview Dairy v. Jones, 157 F.2d 5 (2d cir. 1946), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 787 (1946); K.C.
DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 608 (1951).
191. Evergreens v. Nunan, 141 F.2d 927, 929 (2d Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 720
(1944).
192. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
193. 393 F. Supp. 305 (D. Or. 1974).
194. Id. at 305-07.
195. Id. at 307 (citing Willamette View Manor v. Peet, 252 Or. 142, 143, 448 P.2d 546,
547 (1968)).
196. Id. at 309-10. The same was true in Sims, of course, although the reasons were differ-
ent. The SSDSC also had no incentive to litigate because it believed the felony prosecution
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found no evidence suggesting the plaintiff could have anticipated the ap-
plication of collateral estoppel: "The novelty of the issue presented dem-
onstrates that prior Oregon ... law provides [that] ... information in a
claim file is confidential and only for use in connection with the claim.
This statement might suggest that information regarding employment
proceedings and their outcome could not be used in a civil action."' 197 A
similar system of confidentiality is in place for welfare files in Califor-
nia. 198 Before Sims few prosecutors would have anticipated the use of
collateral estoppel based on a fair hearing determination. It is unlikely,
or at least was unlikely, that the district attorney's office even would have
been aware of scheduled fair hearings. In addition, a number of welfare
fraud cases probably are not uncovered until the fair hearing stage or
later. Thus, even after Sims, prosecutors may be taken by surprise.
Worse, unlike plaintiffs such as Lewis, the district attorney is legally
powerless to protect against the application of collateral estoppel. When,
as in Sims, the two proceedings are of greatly disproportionate impor-
tance, it is doubtful a public prosecutor's office should ever be bound by
an administrative determination arising in a forum in which it could not
participate.
C. Effects on the Original Tribunal
Unfairness and lack of foreseeability or surprise are accompanied in
the Sims rule by a failure to recognize the potential hardship to the agen-
cies involved. As Justice Kaus notes in Sims, 199 and the supreme court
itself did in Dennis B.,20 the spurious use of preclusion in more serious
subsequent litigation is undesirable because it may result in various unto-
ward effects on a first tribunal hearing over a relatively minor matter.
Like Justice Kaus, the judge in Lewis was concerned with the impact a
finding of collateral estoppel might have on the agency itself:
The average hearing lasts forty-five minutes. The referees who con-
duct the hearings are not necessarily lawyers. Over six thousand hear-
ings were conducted during the fiscal year 1972-73. The State
anticipates that a decision in favor of Defendants would cause an in-
crease in representation by counsel in Employment Division hearings
with a resulting increase in the length and complexity of the hearings.
Current Employment Division staffing levels would be inadequate to
divested DSS of jurisdiction to proceed with the fair hearing. Sims, 32 Cal. 3d at 474, 651 P.2d
at 325, 186 Cal. Rptr at 80.
197. Lewis, 393 F. Supp. at 309.
198. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 10850 (West 1980).
199. See Sims, 32 Cal. 3d at 494, 651 P.2d at 337-38, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 93 (Kaus, J.,
dissenting).
200. In re Dennis B., 18 Cal. 3d 687, 695, 557 P.2d 514, 520, 135 Cal. Rptr. 82, 88 (1976).
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handle this burden. In the absence of clear authority from the state
courts, this Court will not inflict the hardship that could result by
making a state agency's hearings legal battlegrounds for the indirect
resolution of claims involving amounts substantially larger than the
agency was designed to process.
20 1
In Sims the California Supreme Court did give that "clear authority."
V. Legislative and Judicial Responses to Sims
The impact of Sims has not come primarily in welfare fair hear-
ings, 20 2 but in other administrative areas. For example, with Sims' disap-
proval of the Empire Star Mines203 decision, many parties to
Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board hearings began to anticipate
potential use of collateral estoppel in wrongful discharge actions.2°4 As a
result, in some cases hearings are designed to be brief and informal, like
those at the DSS and unemployment compensation hearings in Oregon,
took on the aspects of a full-blown trial.20 5
201. Lewis, 393 F. Supp. at 309 (footnote omitted); see Imen v. Glassford, 201 Cal. App.
3d 898, 911-12, 247 Cal. Rptr. 514, 521-22 (1988) (Benke, J., dissenting).
202. People v. Shultz, 151 Cal. App. 3d 714, 718, 199 Cal. Rptr. 33, 35 (1984), determined
collateral estoppel could not be raised on an appeal after a plea of nolo contendere where the
defense did not assert the doctrine in the trial court. Sims appeared while that appeal was
pending. But the court of appeal in People v. Meyer, 183 Cal. App. 3d 1150, 1158-59, 228 Cal.
Rptr. 635, 639 (1986), allowed the appeal after a guilty plea where the issue was raised in the
trial court. The court of appeal in People v. Rodriguez, 160 Cal. App. 3d 650, 654 n. 1, 206
Cal. Rptr. 79, 82 (1984), stated Sims should not be applied retroactively.
In Meyer, 183 Cal. App. 3d at 1165-66, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 644-45, Rodriguez, 160 Cal.
App. 3d at 654, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 81-82, and People v. Wilson, 169 Cal. App. 3d 1149, 1156,
215 Cal. Rptr. 694, 698 (1985), the court of appeal distinguished Sims because the issues deter-
mined at the fair hearings were not identical to those before the courts. Finally, Madrid v.
McMahon, 183 Cal. App. 3d 151, 156-57, 228 Cal. Rptr. 14, 18 (1986), held a welfare fraud
defendant had no right to compel a fair hearing when the county did not elect to attempt
recovery of the overpayment. Thus, if reported decisions are any gauge, Sims does not appear
to have affected welfare fraud prosecutions appreciably. What it may have done to fair hearing
procedures would be of interest, however. If any investigation of that question has been done,
research has failed to reveal it.
203. Sims, 32 Cal. 3d at 479-80 n.8, 651 P.2d at 328 n.8, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 84 n.8; Empire
Star Mines Co. v. Cal. Emp. Comm'n, 28 Cal. 2d 33, 168 P.2d 686 (1946).
204. In 1968, the court of appeal had refused to give res judicata effect to a determination
of the Cal. Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board because that agency did not exercise
judicial power. Pratt v. Local 683, 260 Cal. App. 2d 545, 562, 67 Cal. Rptr. 483, 494 (1968).
205. Increasingly, parties to unemployment proceedings are arguing that findings by
the Appeals Board are binding in subsequent civil suits. This puts employers at a
disadvantage in these suits because they tend to treat prior UI hearings informally;
and because the standards of evidence are less rigorous in a UI hearing than in a
formal civil proceeding. Employers are thereby placed at a disadvantage when UI
proceedings and decisions are determined to be conclusive in subsequent civil suits.
This has resulted in increased UI Appeals Board delays and costs, as employers are
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Under the leadership of the California Chamber of Commerce, em-
ployers' groups, stung by the draining legal fees generated in these strug-
gles to obtain a collateral estoppel advantage in an administrative forum,
sought assistance in the legislature. 20 6 Their effort achieved an ironic
success. Less than three weeks after the Governor signed Assembly Bill
3950, which enacted California Unemployment Insurance Code section
1960,207 precluding the use of unemployment compensation decisions in
other tribunals, 20 8 the court of appeal held:
The issue before the administrative law judge was whether Robinson
had committed the kind of "misconduct" which would prohibit an
award of unemployment compensation. In unemployment compensa-
tion proceedings, the word "misconduct" is limited to "'. . . conduct
evincing such wilful or wanton disregard of an employer's interests as
is found in deliberate violations or disregard of standards of behavior
which the employer has the right to expect of his employee ........
[Citations.]" In other words, mere poor performance cannot be
equated with "misconduct." Consequently the administrative law
judge's finding did not preclude [the employer] from showing [in a sub-
increasing[ly] hiring attorneys to represent them before the UI Appeals Board due to
the possibility for the use of the proceedings and decisions in a subsequent civil suit.
Assem. Fin. & Ins. Com., Repub. Analysis of Assem. Bill 3950 (Apr. 27, 1986) (on file at the
Hastings Law Journal). Why employers did not simply rein in their counsel instead of ap-
proaching the legislature is a puzzling question.
206. The proposed statutory exemption was also supported by the California Manufactur-
ers Association, California Hospital Association, California Taxpayers Association, Sears Mer-
chandise Group, Northrop Corporation, and Helpmates Company. It was opposed by the
California Teamsters Public Affairs Council, California Trial Lawyers Association, State La-
bor Federation, and the Administrative Law Judges Committee of the Los Angeles County
Bar Association. Assem. Com. on Fin. & Ins., Unemp. Disab. Ins. sub. com., report on As-
sem. Bill 3950 (Apr. 28, 1986) (on file at the Hastings Law Journal). Legislative committees
specifically recognized the effect of Sims' rejection of Empire Star Mines. Assem. Com. on Fin.
& Ins., Unemp. Disab. Ins. Sub. Com., report on Assem. Bill 3950 (Apr. 14, 1986) (on file at
the Hastings Law Journal).
207. It provides:
Any finding of fact or law, judgment, conclusion, or final order made by a hearing
officer, administrative law judge, or any person with the authority to make findings of
fact or law in any action or proceeding before the appeals board, shall not be conclu-
sive or binding in any separate or subsequent action or proceeding, and shall not be
used as evidence in any separate or subsequent action or proceeding, between an
individual and his or her present or prior employer brought before an arbitrator,
court, or judge of this state or the United States, regardless of whether the prior
action was between the same or related parties or involved the same facts.
CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 1960 (West Supp. 1989).
208. The legislature had acted similarly-and more concisely-previously. CAL. UNEMP.
INS. CODE § 1256.7 (West 1986). This statute provides in part, "Findings of fact and law by
the director shall not collaterally estop adjudication of the issue of sexual harassment in an-
other forum." Id. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 52-54 (1974).
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sequent wrongful termination action] that Robinson was discharged
solely for poor performance. 209
Although the opinion had no reason to, and did not, deal with an em-
ployer's potential defensive use of an administrative determination of
misconduct, there is seemingly no reason why that would not be appro-
priate under the Sims rationale. By definition the standard of miscon-
duct required to justify denial of unemployment benefits would always
support discharge of an employee. Thus, apparently confused by the
legal terrain and spurred on by employers who may have been victimized
by their own attorneys' enthusiasm for the Unemployment Compensa-
tion Appeals Board as a new source of billable hours, the employers'
lobby shot itself in the foot. It accomplished an elimination of a legal
tool only the employer could wield under the Sims rationale. 210
The court of appeal, however, declined to follow Sims in one such
case.21 1 The issue in Mahon v. Safeco Title Insurance Co. was whether
section 1960 applied to pending wrongful discharge actions when the un-
employment compensation decision was final before the effective date of
the statute.212 The employer argued "it justifiably relied upon the...
expectation that the [Board] determination would be given collateral es-
toppel effect in vigorously litigating the [compensation] claim in the ad-
ministrative forum. The theory of justification is that after People v. Sims
... at common law the [Board] determination would have been entitled
to collateral estoppel effect."'213A
The court rejected the contention, partly on the grounds that Sims
would not be applicable in any event. It gave the following reasons for
its decision: (1) minimal stakes are involved at the administrative hear-
ing; (2) different remedies are available in the two proceedings; (3) a
party might be "sandbagged" by use of collateral estoppel under these
circumstances; and (4) deployment of greater resources in the adminis-
209. Robinson v. Hewlett-Packard Corp., 183 Cal. App. 3d 1108, 1123-24, 228 Cal. Rptr.
591, 599-600 (1986) (quoting Maywood Glass Co. v. Stewart, 170 Cal. App. 2d 719, 724, 339
P.2d 947 (1959)); see also Amador v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 35 Cal. 3d 671, 684-85,
677 P.2d 224, 231-32, 200 Cal. Rptr. 298, 305-06 (1984) (earlier determination by Unemploy-
ment Insurance Appeals Board that claimant was properly fired for insubordination did not
estop her from litigating the reasonableness of her conduct in a subsequent wrongful termina-
tion action).
210. Mutuality, of course, has long since been eliminated as an element of collateral estop-
pel. Bernhard v. Bank of Am., 19 Cal. 2d 807, 812-814, 122 P.2d 892, 895-96 (1942).
211. Mahon v. Safeco Title Ins. Co., 199 Cal. App. 3d 616, 245 Cal. Rptr. 103 (1988)
(employer is prevented from using collateral estoppel to bar employee's wrongful discharge
claim that had been decided against the employee in a prior administrative hearing).
212. Id. at 618-19, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 104.
213. Id. at 621, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 106.
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trative forum would bring delay to a system designed to be speedy.
21 4
These points have merit; but they were essentially ignored by the Sims
majority.
VI. A Practical Example of Current Administrative Preclusion
Problems
As mentioned above, the impact of Sims on the criminal prosecution
of welfare fraud has been minimal, at least as far as the appellate reports
reveal. Recipient-defendants have not found it easy to meet the Sims
criteria. 2 15 And Sims has been contained, both by the legislature and by
the court of appeal, in an area in which it did cause difficulty, Unemploy-
ment Compensation Appeals Board decisions.2 16 Moreover, administra-
tive preclusion has been asserted with little success in a number of other
contexts since Sims. 2 17 The agency with perhaps the greatest number of
administrative adjudications paralleled by criminal prosecutions is the
Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV). There is a constant overlap, for
example, in judicial and administrative proceedings against drunk drivers
who have refused chemical tests. The DMV is charged with the enforce-
ment of the implied consent law, which mandates an automatic license
suspension for persons lawfully arrested for driving under the influence
of alcohol who refuse to submit to a blood-alcohol test.21 8 DMV "refusal
hearings" are informal affairs in which the referee also acts as the prose-
cutor.219 The DMV referee is not an administrative law judge and need
not be, and rarely, if ever, is an attorney; the referee's findings are only
advisory to the Director.220 Additionally, the DMV, like the DSS, does
not enjoy judicial power under the California Constitution.
214. Id. at 622-23, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 106-07.
215. See supra note 202 and accompanying text.
216. See supra section V.
217. See, e.g., People v. O'Daniel, 194 Cal. App. 3d 715, 720-25, 239 Cal. Rptr. 790, 793-
96 (1987) (finding of guilt at a prison disciplinary hearing does not collaterally estop a subse-
quent prosecution for possession of a weapon); Rutherford v. State, 188 Cal. App. 3d 1267,
1282-83, 233 Cal. Rptr. 781, 788-89 (1987) (collateral estoppel does not preclude relitigation of
the constitutionality of a statute when it is uncertain whether the appellate division of the
superior court had addressed the issue); Holt v. Dep't of Food & Agric., 171 Cal. App. 3d 427,
433, 218 Cal. Rptr. 1, 4-5 (1985) (acquittal of a pilot in a prior criminal proceeding does not
preclude the enforcement of administrative proceedings against him); cf. Lockwood v. Supe-
rior Court, 160 Cal. App. 3d 667, 672, 206 Cal. Rptr. 785, 787-88 (1984) (determination in a
juvenile court dependency proceeding that a child was not abused estops criminal prosecution
of parents).
218. CAL. VEHI. CODE § 13353 (West 1987); id. § 23157 (West Supp. 1989).
219. CAL. VEH. CODE § 13353 (West 1987).
220. CAL. VEHi. CODE § 40666 (West 1985) (repealed 1986). See CAL. VEH. CODE
§ 40750.5 (West 1985) (repealed 1986) and CAL. VEH. CODE § 40760 (West 1985) (repealed
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More frequently than in the case of welfare fair hearings, the same
factors that triggered the implied consent hearing will almost always lead
to a parallel criminal action. The district attorney, however, plays no
official role in the administrative proceeding and may be unaware of its
existence. Also, there is typically very little communication between the
DMV and the district attorney respecting their mutual caseload.
The issues of the lawfulness of the arrest and of whether there was
an actual refusal to submit to a chemical test are critical in both the
DMV refusal hearings and the prosecution of drinking motorists. Conse-
quently, considerable debate raged in the courts of appeal, even before
Sims, as to whether an initial determination of those questions in favor of
the arrestee would be accorded collateral estoppel effect. One view, echo-
ing the reasoning of People v. LaMotte,221 rejected the application of col-
lateral estoppel in the context of a drunk driving prosecution: "[T]he
doctrine of collateral estoppel [cannot] apply to proceedings under Vehi-
cle Code section 13353. The DMV in its role of controlling the licensing
of drivers is not in privity with the prosecutor in a criminal proceeding
.... The DMV has no power to control the criminal proceedings [or]
intervene .. "222
In Shackelton v. Department of Motor Vehicles,223 however, the
court of appeal upheld judicial preclusion of the DMV. Specifically, it
decided a municipal court's ruling in a suppression hearing in favor of
the defendant motorist bound the DMV on the issue of the lawfulness of
1986) (explaining that the administrative adjudication program is being replaced with court
adjudication of traffic matters).
221. 92 Cal. App. 3d 604, 155 Cal. Rptr. 5 (1979).
222. Lofthouse v. Brown, 124 Cal. App. 3d 730, 737, 177 Cal. Rptr. 601, 605 (1981); see
also Reed v. Cal. Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 102 Cal. App. 3d 662, 666-67, 164 Cal. Rptr. 373,
375 (1979) (rejecting motorists' attempts to collaterally estop DMV based on court determina-
tion or prosecutor's stipulation that criminal defendants did not refuse test); Skinner v. Sillas,
58 Cal. App. 3d 591, 597, 130 Cal. Rptr. 91, 94 (1976).
223. 46 Cal. App. 3d 327, 119 Cal. Rptr. 921 (1975). Shackelton was authored by Acting
Presiding Justice Jackson, the author of People v. Demery, 104 Cal. App. 3d 548, 163 Cal.
Rptr. 814 (1980), the case in which collateral estoppel effect was denied to a finding of the
Board of Medical Quality Assurance in the subsequent prosecution of a physician.
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the arrest in an implied consent hearing. 224 The Shackelton rule appears
ascendant in the wake of Sims. 225
Still, one suspects that even in DMV and municipal court proceed-
ings, the area where collateral estoppel currently is invoked most often in
the administrative/criminal prosecution context, the use of the doctrine
is relatively infrequent and haphazard, depending to a great extent on the
sophistication of the counsel involved. For example, there appear to be
no published cases in which a first finding of the DMV has been urged to
estop at a subsequent criminal trial or suppression hearing, 226 although a
recent decision strongly implies it would.227 Moreover, no cases have
been published in which the state has sought to use the first result offen-
sively in either forum.
There are probably practical explanations in each instance. Because
so few motorists prevail at refusal hearings on a finding of an unlawful
arrest, the opportunities to assert collateral estoppel against the district
224. Shackelton, 46 Cal. App. 3d at 330-31, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 923-24. Numerous decisions
before and since, however, have confined judicial determinations in suppression hearings to the
cases in which the determinations were made, whether the estoppel was asserted in another
court, civil or criminal, or an administrative agency. In re Martinez, 1 Cal. 3d 641, 650-51,
463 P.2d 734, 740-41, 83 Cal. Rptr. 382, 388-89, cert. denied, 400 U.S. 851 (1970); People v.
Van Eyk, 56 Cal. 2d 471, 477, 364 P.2d 326, 329-30, 15 Cal. Rptr. 150, 153-54 (1961); People
v. Gephart, 93 Cal. App. 3d 989, 998-1000, 156 Cal. Rptr. 489, 494-96 (1979); People v. Wil-
liams, 89 Cal. App. 3d 1026, 1031-32, 152 Cal. Rptr. 892, 895-96 (1979); Governing Bd. v.
Metcalf, 36 Cal. App. 3d 546, 551, 111 Cal. Rptr. 724, 727-28 (1974).
But there is an exception in an area of law where it might least be expected. See Allen v.
McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 96-105 (1980) and Novick v. City of Los Angeles, 148 Cal. App. 3d
325, 331, 195 Cal. Rptr. 747, 751-52 (1983) (results of litigated suppression hearings in crimi-
nal cases are binding in subsequent 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights actions); cf Haring v. Prosise,
462 U.S. 306, 312-17 (1983) (no preclusion against plaintiff who pleaded guilty and did not
contest alleged fourth Amendment violation).
225. See Buttimer v. Alexis, 146 Cal. App. 3d 754, 760, 194 Cal. Rptr. 603, 606 (1983):
DMV may have no control over the actions of the [d]istrict [a]ttorney[;] however, the
district attorney represents the State of California in criminal matters, and DMV
represents the interests of the State of California in its hearings .... [T]he state ... is
the real party in interest in both proceedings and the requirement of privity as an
element of collateral estoppel is satisfied.
Also, in Vary v. Forrest, 201 Cal. App. 3d 1506, 1514, 247 Cal. Rptr. 873, 878 (1988), Justice
Work, in a concurring opinion, noted the cases have found privity between the district attor-
ney and DMV only where the court made legal findings necessary for its judgment. Privity s
rejected if the court's findings relate only to issues not necessary to a determination of guilt or
innocence; but see Pawlowski v. Pierce 202 Cal. App. 3d 692, 696-99, 249 Cal. Rptr. 49, 50-52
(1988) (acquittal of defendant in a prosecution for willful refusal did not estop DMV from
reaching a contrary conclusion because the issues in the two proceedings were not identical).
226. The court of appeal did apply collateral estoppel in such a situation in 1987, but the
California Supreme Court ordered the opinion depublished. Gonzalez v. Municipal Court,
formerly at 196 Cal. App. 3d 331, 242 Cal. Rptr. 60, 66 (1987).
227. Buttimer, 146 Cal. App. 3d at 760, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 606 ("Here the District attorney
... and the County ... are 'sufficiently close' to warrant applying collateral estoppel.")
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attorney are likely to be few. Also, the bureaucracies involved may have
remained as oblivious to the possible offensive use of collateral estoppel
as they usually are to each other's activities.
Communications between the DMV and the district attorney, how-
ever, may improve. In addition to a license suspension at the DMV, the
legislature also recently elevated a refusal to take a chemical test to an
enhancement of the crime of driving under the influence itself, which
requires, inter alia, a mandatory 48-hour jail sentence upon convic-
tion.228 Thus, each forum will now litigate whether there was a refusal in
addition to the issue, in some cases, of the lawfulness of the arrest. The
statutory change may tend to intensify litigation in both places. For
now, however, the impact of Sims on DMV hearings and drunk driving
prosecutions probably is not particularly significant; and the benefits of
issue preclusion in that setting may well be worth whatever there is.
When the stakes are relatively small, the Sims rule might be a salutary
economy for everyone involved.
VII. Proposals for Limiting the Scope of Administrative
Collateral Estoppel
Use of administrative collateral estoppel will not necessarily be salu-
tary in felony cases or "serious misdemeanors," such as vehicular man-
slaughter 229 and violations of occupational safety rules. In other matters,
even sporadic application of preclusion may do considerable harm. For
example, dispensing drugs unlawfully,230 embezzling from a client, or
committing a fraud involving real property, are offenses that may trigger
a spurious disciplinary decision favorable to the professional and insulate
a crooked physician, lawyer, or real estate broker from the reach of the
criminal law. Erroneous state personnel hearing decisions might do the
same for employees who turn out to merit prosecution based on the same
alleged misconduct.
Consistency, economy, and avoidance of harassment are not worth
such a jarring intrusion into the public prosecutor's traditional monopoly
on the litigation of criminal causes. A county district attorney generally
is not aware of the proceedings before the myriad adjudicative agencies
on the state level; and, although he may have influence in some cases, he
228. CAL. VEH. CODE § 23159 (West Supp. 1988).
229. See In re Dennis B., 18 Cal. 3d 687, 696, 557 P.2d 514, 520, 135 Cal. Rptr. 82, 88
(1976); Perschbacher, Rethinking Collateral Estoppel. Limiting the Preclusive Effect ofAdmin-
istrative Determinations in Judicial Proceedings, 35 U. FLA. L. REV. 422, 458-62 (1983).
230. If People v. Demery, 104 Cal. App. 3d 548, 163 Cal. Rptr. 816'(1980) survives Sims,
physicians alone, perhaps, will be treated differently.
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has no right to control the handling of any of them. In this respect issue
preclusion may lead to inaccurate and inconsistent outcomes. The legis-
lature should consider the following proposals to properly contain it.
One method to limit the doctrine's application would be to bar the
use of collateral estoppel in serious criminal cases. For example, those in
which the potential period of incarceration exceeds six months might be
a reasonable cut-off point. The defense, perhaps, should be allowed to
offer proof of a favorable administrative result in evidence.2 3' This solu-
tion might lessen litigation at the agency level, while giving some recog-
nition to a determination favoring the citizen. Because the hearing
officers both present the case and recommend the disposition to the direc-
tor of the DMV, their neutrality is suspect and thus the hearing results
should not be usable by the criminal prosecutor. In the important cases,
this proposal also would preserve the prosecution's right to a jury trial,
eliminate the possibility of surprise, and avoid the perpetuation and mag-
nification of unjust results.
In civil litigation, administrative preclusion should be permitted
with respect to agencies exercising judicial power under the California
Constitution, both as to matters of law and fact. It would be an improve-
ment, however, to except those cases in which the agency's legal interpre-
tation is clearly erroneous. Errors of law should be stamped out, not
perpetuated.
Administrative adjudications of agencies not granted judicial power
under the constitution or via a constitutional legislative authorization,
such as the DSS, should not be treated in the same manner in civil litiga-
tion. One suspects their procedures and rules of evidence are often so
streamlined for the sake of expediency that outcomes may not be reliable
in many instances. Additionally, in these proceedings there may be little
incentive to litigate because only a minor sum or controversy is at stake;
the hearing officer or department head making the ultimate resolution
may not be an attorney; preclusion may not be reasonably foreseeable in
light of the difficulty in predicting which agency decisions are affected by
Sims; and in many cases use of collateral estoppel would have a detri-
mental effect on the agency itself by creating a false incentive to litigate.
The legislature might also consider the following proposals with re-
spect to preclusion asserted after adjudications by agencies without con-
stitutionally based judicial power. California could return to the rule of
Empire Star Mines, that is, overturn Sims, or at least specifically enumer-
ate the agencies to which the Sims holding might apply. If preclusion in
231. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 60 (1974).
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the superior court is permitted after a decision of any such agency, at a
minimum courts should be authorized to reject administrative determi-
nations not supported by substantial evidence in the record and those
founded upon errors of law, as well as those in which so little was at
stake it is unlikely a complete presentation would have been made by the
parties. The latter could be accomplished by defining categories of mini-
mums based on the relief pursued in the first proceeding. If money was
sought, did the amount exceed, for example, $25,000, the current juris-
dictional limit of the municipal court?232 Also, was a license suspended
or revoked, or only restricted?
Finally, the legislature might decide preclusion should be rejected
when based on any proceeding in which the losing party was not repre-
sented by counsel or the hearing officer was not an attorney. It makes
little sense to preclude serious litigation, particularly a felony prosecu-
tion, by means of a decision obtained without the participation of a single
lawyer, much less the district attorney. Unfortunately, that was exactly
what occurred in Sims.
Conclusion
Sims is a polished and well-crafted decision in many ways. It breaks
considerable new ground, notwithstanding its own disclaimers to the
contrary. Unfortunately, it reaches a wrong result and misinterprets the
law of collateral estoppel. Consequently, the opinion is a spurious bea-
con that may cause the vessels of many worthy lawsuits to founder on
the rocks of a false harbor. The legislature should consider whether, and
in what form, it should be allowed to stand.
232. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 86 (West Supp. 1989).
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